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Given capacity limits, only a subset of stimuli give rise to a conscious percept. 
Neurocognitive models suggest that humans have evolved mechanisms that operate without 
awareness and prioritize threatening stimuli over neutral stimuli in subsequent processing and 
perception. In this meta analysis, we review evidence for this ‘standard hypothesis’ 
emanating from three widely used, but rather different experimental paradigms that have 
been used to manipulate awareness. We found a small pooled threat-bias effect in the masked 
visual probe paradigm, a medium effect in the binocular rivalry paradigm and highly 
inconsistent effects in the breaking continuous flash suppression paradigm. Substantial 
heterogeneity was explained by the stimulus type: the only threat stimuli that were robustly 
prioritized across all three paradigms were fearful faces. Meta regression revealed that 
anxiety may modulate threat-biases, but only under specific presentation conditions. We also 
found that insufficiently rigorous awareness measures, inadequate control of response biases 
and low level confounds may undermine claims of genuine unconscious threat processing. 
Considering the data together, we suggest that uncritical acceptance of the standard 
hypothesis is premature: current behavioral evidence for threat-sensitive visual processing 
that operates outside of awareness is very weak. 
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Background 
Our eyes receive a vast array of visual information. However, due to capacity limits, 
only a sub-set of stimuli are consciously perceived at any one time (Dehaene & Changuex, 
2011). The visual system must cope with these capacity constraints by guiding sensory 
processing towards the stimuli that are most important to our survival. Since it may take 
hundreds of milliseconds for visual stimulation to generate a conscious percept (Koch, 2004) 
it would be advantageous for threats to influence perception or behavior (e.g. by directing 
attention, or initiating physiological responses) before, or independently of their conscious 
registration. Such an advantage could, quite literally, be the difference between survival and 
death. The ‘standard hypothesis’ (Tamietto & deGelder, 2010) holds that humans have 
evolved a dedicated subcortical visual pathway that evaluates threat independently of 
conscious awareness and guides the selection of stimulus information for prioritized 
processing (Ohman, 2005; Ohman, Carlsson, Lundqvist, & Ingvar, 2007). However, despite 
the intuitive appeal of this notion, the extent to which threatening stimuli are genuinely 
processed in the absence of awareness remains strongly debated (Pessoa, 2005; Pessoa & 
Adolphs, 2010). 
It is clear and uncontroversial that we are not aware of all aspects of visual 
processing; for instance, we cannot report the ‘low-level’ activity of individual retinal 
ganglion cells. Rather, the majority of research interest (and controversy) in unconscious 
perception is rooted in claims that the ‘meaning’ of a stimulus (such as whether it is 
threatening) can be registered without awareness and influence subsequent perceptual and 
cognitive operations (Goodale & Milner, 2004; Hannula, Simons & Cohen, 2005; 
Hesselmann & Moors, 2015; Pessoa, 2005). 
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To investigate this issue, techniques that allow visual input to be dissociated from 
awareness such as backward masking, binocular rivalry and continuous flash suppression 
have become widely used (see Figure 1). These methods have the potential to reveal the 
answer to the question: ‘Are visual threats prioritized without awareness?’. We present a 
critical review and meta-analysis of this literature. 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of PubMed citations that include the terms ‘backward masking’, ‘binocular 
rivalry’ and ‘continuous flash suppression’ in the title and / or abstract as a function of 
publication date. 
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The present review: Justification and Scope. 
Understanding the division of labour between conscious and unconscious processes 
has attracted considerable research effort (Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Dubois & Faivre, 2014; 
Gayet, Van der Stigchel, & Paffen; Hassin, 2013). Moreover, the extent to which 
unconsciously presented threats modulate perception remains one of the most contested 
issues in psychology. Previous reviews of this topic (e.g. Hannula et al., 2005; Pessoa, 2005) 
have been narrative rather than quantitative, and have drawn on a limited sample of 
publications. A comprehensive meta-analysis is particularly valuable in the area of 
unconscious perception, where findings are controversial and inconsistent. Null effects 
induced by unconsciously presented stimuli might be due to the genuine absence of an effect, 
or due to the necessary weakening of visual signals induced by the paradigms used to 
manipulate awareness. Effect sizes in the literature may therefore be small, which makes 
parameter estimation and power analysis particularly informative for future studies.  
 Our review also provides insight into the relationship between awareness and other 
visual selection processes, such as attention. There is some dispute as to whether awareness 
of and attending to a stimulus are equivalent constructs, or whether the conscious vs. 
unconscious processing distinction is entirely separate from attentional selection (Koch & 
Tsuchiya, 2007; Lamme, 2003). There is also a related, ongoing discussion about whether 
attention is necessary or sufficient for awareness and vice versa (Cohen, Cavanagh, Chun & 
Nakayama, 2012; van Boxtel, Tsuchiya & Koch, 2010). Quantifying the extent to which 
attentional selection occurs independently of awareness provides empirical data to inform this 
debate. 
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 Our analyses are also important in the context of emotional disorders such as anxiety. 
Although threat sensitive mechanisms enable humans to respond effectively to danger, 
anxiety can be a maladaptive condition that is prototypically associated with hypersensitivity 
to threat, excessive fear and disruption to normal functioning (Eysenck, 1997). Prominent 
cognitive theories suggest that this hypersensitivity contributes to the etiology, maintenance 
or exacerbation of anxiety (Bishop, 2007; Matthews & Macleod, 2005). Specifically, this 
hypersensitivity is thought to arise from dysfunction in ‘automatic’ threat-sensitive 
mechanisms that operate without conscious awareness (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). A better 
understanding of mechanisms involved in unconscious emotion processing will inform 
cognitive-behavioural models of psychopathology, and help refine therapeutic interventions 
that systematically target discrete cognitive biases e.g. cognitive-behavioural therapies 
(Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) or cognitive bias modification (Beard, 2011).  
 The standard hypothesis, which states that threats are prioritized in the absence of 
their conscious registration, continues to shape a large body of theoretical work, experimental 
research and clinical practice – our review provides a timely and comprehensive analysis of 
evidence in this area. It a) clarifies to what extent and under what conditions threatening 
stimuli are prioritized without awareness. b) It identifies important gaps and shortcomings in 
the literature and c) suggests new directions for future research, including improved methods 
of data acquisition, analysis and reporting. 
Definitions 
 Although most people have an intuitive grasp of what ‘threat’ and ‘conscious 
awareness’ mean, these abstract concepts are hard to define in a manner precise enough for 
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scientific exploration. In fact, in the empirical literature they are often vaguely described and 
have long been a source of confusion (Pessoa, 2008; Le Doux, 2013; Wiens, 2007).  
What is a threatening stimulus? 
Ecological theories propose that there are three braos classes of threatening stimuli, 
which reflect the different mechanisms by which an organism associates a signal with the 
likely occurrence of a negative outcome (Adolphs, 2013; Boyer & Bergstrom, 2011). Firstly, 
there may be an initial repertoire of ‘phylogenetic’ threat stimuli (see Ohman & Mineka, 
2001, for a discussion) whose associations may have been set by evolution, such as an 
approaching predator (Ohman & Mineka, 2001), or heights (Poulton, Davies, Menzies, 
Langley, & Silva, 1998). Secondly, there are ‘ontogenetic’ threats that are learnt to be 
dangerous, such as weapons (Blanchette, 2006). Lastly, there are those stimuli that pose no 
immediate intrinsic threat themselves, but are symbolic, more abstract representations of the 
above two classes of stimuli (e.g. negative word stimuli, warning signs). The mechanisms 
through which these stimuli acquire threat value may vary: e.g. classical conditioning, 
vicarious conditioning/ modeling of others (Ollsson & Phelps, 2007) or through verbal 
pathways (Field, Lawson & Banerjee, 2008). Across a range of species, these three categories 
of stimuli have been found to elicit a continuum of adaptive physiological, behavioral and 
cognitive Reponses that form part of a ‘defensive cascade’ (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1988). 
Moreover, despite the apparent diversity in these stimulus categories, they all elicit the 
subjective experience of negative affect in the large samples of human observers (e.g. 
Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert & Lang, 2001). At the evolutionary level, this may reflect the 
fact that diverse situations of predation, contamination, status ;oss, social exclusion and 
conspecific violence have all been legitimate and recurrent fitness threats for humans, the 
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effects of which are all well documented in the archaeological record (Boyer & Bergstrom, 
2011). At the psychological level, theories have reconciled the apparent diversity of threat 
stimuli with their subjective similarity by proposing that emotional evaluations are mostly 
based on an initial, primitive ‘core’ affective evaluation of whether stimuli are negative or 
positive (Barrett, 2006). These evaluations are termed ‘core’ because bivalent categorical 
distinctions between good and bad (appetitive and aversive) are made by all humans and are 
present from birth (Barret, Mesquita, Ochsner & Gross, 2007). Indeed, emotional evaluations 
of stimuli are mostly explained by the basic dimensions of valence and arousal (Greenwald, 
Cook, & Lang, 1989). 
Based on the above literature, in this review, we define a threatening as any 
negatively valenced visual signal that is predictive of adverse affects to the physical or 
emotional well-being of the receiver. Examples of threat stimuli include fearful faces, images 
of animal attack, negative words and otherwise neutral stimuli that have been conditioned to 
predict a negative event (e.g. via pairing with an electric shock). Considerable evidence 
suggests that these stimuli trigger a broad pattern of defensive physiological responses (e.g. 
Bradley et al., 2001) and adaptive changes in perception, including their prioritized access to 
conscious awareness and attentional resources (e.g. Vuilleumier, 2005; Yang, Zald, & Blake, 
2007).  
What is ‘awareness’ and how is it manipulated and measured? 
Various meanings of the term ‘awareness’ are conflated in cognitive psychology 
(Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011), which are rooted in two, largely 
independent research domains. These are i) subliminal perception: which is concerned with 
the processing of stimuli of which one is unaware and ii) unconscious cognition: which is 
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concerned with mental processes of which one is unaware (Hassin, 2013). In our review, the 
term “awareness” is used to refer to the former definition, i.e. the awareness of a stimulus.  
How has awareness of stimuli been measured? The simplest, but least conservative 
method is to use observers’ reports to index whether a stimulus is perceived. Historically, this 
subjective approach derives its motivation from the idea that only observers themselves have 
access to their inner states and that this is the only reliable source of information about 
conscious experience (James, 1890).  However the development of signal detection theory 
(SDT: Green & Swets, 1996), raised concerns that subjective measures are prone to response 
bias or criterion effects, such as a reluctance to report a signal if it is degraded or brief. 
According to SDT, due to internal neural noise, the absence of a signal may elicit a strong 
sensory state and the presence of a signal may elicit a weak sensory state. Reports of 
awareness are thus probabilistic statements based on an internal threshold thay demarcates 
sufficient “strength of evidence” that a signal was present (Pastore, Crawley, Berens & 
Skelly, 2003). If an observer sets this threshold too high, they may incorrectly reject their 
conscious perception (a Type 2 error) and report they are ‘unaware’ of the stimulis. As a 
result of these issues associated with subjective report, objective criteria have also been 
employed to determine awareness. The objective approach measures awareness according to 
an observer’s ability to perform statistically above chance in discriminating alternative 
stimulus states (e.g. left or right location) in a forced-choice classification task (Macmillan & 
Creelmen, 2005). For instance, observers might be given 100 trials in which they are asked to 
report whether a stimulus appeared left or right of fixation (where both are equally probable). 
Under the null hypothesis (observers are unaware of the stimulus), we would expect 
observers to respond correctly on approximately 50 of the trials (the most likely outcome 
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given random responses). However, if an observer achieves 59 or more correct responses, the 
null hypothesis is rejected (performance is ‘significantly’ above chance performance, 
according to a binomial test) and that observer would be classified as ‘objectively aware’. 
Objective awareness checks that probe stimulus detection via discrimination of a stimulus 
dimension (e.g. “was it on the left or right?”) that is orthogonal to the critical dimension 
(“was it visible?”) are thougth to be less prone to the response biases that can affect an 
observer’s subjective report of the phenomena under investigation. A current view is that 
both objective and subjective measures have conceptual and practical limitations and so a 
range of measures should be used in combination to comprehensively characterize visual 
awareness (for extended discussion see Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard & Cleeremans, 
2010; Szcepanowski & Pessoa, 2007; Wiens, 2007). 
Experimental Paradigms 
We applied three criteria when searching the evidence base for experimental 
paradigms to investigate our research question. Firstly, we reasoned that the paradigm must 
include an experimental manipulation that suppress threatening and neutral stimuli from 
awareness. Secondly the paradigm must include a behavioral measure sensitive to enhanced 
perceptual selection of the threatening (relative to the neutral) stimulus to index its 
prioritization. Paradigms that manipulate awareness, but measure ‘late’ semantic congruency 
effects unrelated to perceptual selection (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004), such as masked 
Stroop and masked semantic priming, were not included (other meta-analyses on these 
subjects exist elsewhere, see Bar Haim et al., 2007; Van den Bussche, Van den Noortgrate, & 
Reynvoet, 2009). Third, we made an a priori decision that each paradigm must be 
represented by at least 10 independent studies to allow useful and informative analyses. A 
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summary of other excluded paradigms is included in supplementary material S1. 
Implementing these criteria resulted in the inclusion of three experimental paradigms in the 
analyses: masked visual probe, binocular rivalry and breaking continuous flash suppression.  
The Masked Visual Probe Paradigm 
Description. 
In backward masking, a briefly presented target stimulus is quickly replaced by a 
salient, co-located ‘mask’ stimulus (typically before 40 ms). If the presentation parameters 
are manipulated appropriately, observers indicate being aware of the mask, but not the target 
stimulus, i.e. the target is masked from conscious perception. Backward masking appears to 
disrupt and replace visual processing of the target stimulus (Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2000; 
Rolls, Tovee, & Panzeri, 1999). Theories suggest that masking weakens and abbreviates the 
target-related visual signal, eliminating re-entrant feedback from later stages of processing, 
which is critical for maintaining a representation in awareness (Dehaene, Changeux, 
Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006; Green et al., 2005). Masking is relatively simple to 
administer and continues to be widely used in studies that aim to manipulate visual 
awareness. 
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The masked visual probe (MVP) paradigm combines backward masking with an 
attentional cuing paradigm. The generic trial sequence is shown in Figure 2: (i) Observers 
view a central fixation point. (ii) A threat stimulus and a neutral stimulus are presented either 
side of fixation for a brief duration (typically <40ms), immediately followed by (iii) co-
located mask stimuli. (iv) A probe stimulus is then presented at either the location preceded 
by the threat (valid) or the neutral stimulus (invalid). (v) Observers are asked to report an 
aspect of the probe (a two alternative forced choice discrimination) as quickly as possible. 
Figure 2. Schematic of generic trial sequence from a masked visual probe (MVP) task. 
What can the MVP paradigm tell us and how is this evidenced? 
The MVP paradigm provides an effective tool to probe the theoretical construct to the 
“orienting network” (Posner, 2012). Since our cognitive systems have limited capacity, they 
need mechanisms to selectively enhance perceptual processing of relevant, particularly 
threatening, stimuli. The orienting network is involved in this process by changing the 
distribution of processing resources across the visual field: attention is disengaged from an 
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initial location (or locations) and engaged elsewhere. This re-distribution of attention is 
indexed by enhanced behavioral performance and increase neural activity at attended, versus 
unattended locations (Chica, Martin-Arvalo, Botta & Lupianez, 2014). The MVP task was 
developed after initial reports that detection latencies to probe stimuli can be modulated by 
preceding visual cues (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980).  It follows that spatial attention 
can be assessed by comparing response latencies to probes that appear in the location of the 
threat stimulus (often termed ‘valid cue trial’) to those from the neutral location (‘invalid cue 
trial’). Faster responses in valid (vs. invalid) cue trials suggest that attention is preferentially 
drawn to the threat stimulus. Thus, by incorporating masking to manipulate stimulus 
awareness, researchers can determine the extent to which unconsciously presented threat 
stimuli are prioritized in spatial attention. 
Example study: Mogg, Bradley, and Williams (1995). 
 The most frequently cited MVP study included in our analyses was conducted by  
Mogg, Bradley and Williams (1995). The authors examined the attentional biases towards 
subliminally presented negative and neutral stimuli in clinically anxious and healthy control 
participants.  The observers completed an MVP task where they were presented masked pairs 
of negative and neutral words for 14ms. For anxious observers, but not normal controls, 
response to the subsequent probes were significantly faster in valid trials - consistent with 
attention being preferentially drawn to masked threat stimuli. 
 To objectively assess awareness of stimuli, the observers completed a separate block 
of masked trials, where they discriminated between trials in which word stimuli were 
presented prior to the mask (50% of trials), or no stimulus was presented prior to the mask 
(50% of trials). Observers who performed significantly above chance (i.e. significantly above 
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50% accuracy) were removed from the MVP analyses (5 out of 32 participants). Thus, the 
data suggest that anxious observers exhibit attentional biases toward threatening stimuli that 
they are objectively unaware of. The authors interpreted their findings as evidence for an 
“automatic, preconscious processing bias in anxiety” (p. 31).  
Binocular Rivalry 
Description. 
 
Under normal viewing conditions, our two eyes receive slightly different views of the 
world. The visual system is able to combine these similar images into a coherent percept via 
binocular fusion (Howard & Rogers, 1995). However, binocular rivalry (BR) may occur 
when our two eyes receive very different input at corresponding retinal locations, with 
images typically presented separately to each eye via a mirror stereoscope or as a coloured 
anaglyph (see Figure 3). In such cases, the visual system cannot combine the two eyes’ 
images into a coherent percept and instead, perception alternates between them (Wheatstone, 
1838). The extended and invariant visual stimulation in BR is thus rather different from 
backward masking, in which awareness is manipulated by rapidly changing the visual input.  
At a neural level, BR has been attributed to reciprocal inhibition between neural 
populations representing the two eyes’ stimuli at distributed stages of the visual processing 
hierarchy (Blake & Logothetis, 2002). The neural population exerting strongest inhibition 
achieves access to awareness. Subsequent neural adaptation of the dominant population 
progressively reduces inhibition of the suppressed stimulus, resulting in a perceptual switch - 
the previously suppressed stimulus reaches dominance and so on (Alais, Cass, O’Shea & 
Blake, 2012). 
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What can binocular rivalry tell us? How is this evidenced? 
Although BR has been investigated by vision scientists for more than 170 years, a 
landmark paper by Crick and Koch (1998) stimulated a renewed interest in BR research by 
popularizing the idea that it allows investigation of the dynamics and neural concomitants of 
consciousness, owing to its capacity to dissociate visual input from awareness (Baker, 2010). 
At a theoretical level, the perceptual alternation sin BR reflect a natural constraint: two 
different stimuli cannot occupy the same space at the same time, thus the visual system must 
‘choose’ perception of one over the other. Researchers are interested in BR because the 
ensuing ‘choices’ may be indicative of a variety of processes that the visual system uses to 
selectively process the retinal images evoked by the environment.  
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Figure 3. Schematic of typical stimuli, percepts and response options in a binocular rivalry 
paradigm. 
 
BR has some similarity to natural vision, in that competition occurs between multiple 
sensory inputs, with only a subset reaching conscious perception. BR has thus been 
conceptualized as a means to mimic this selection process under more controlled conditions, 
by assessing which of two co-located stimuli are prioritized in the competition for awareness. 
This prioritization is often indexed by the proportion of time that one stimulus dominates (i.e. 
is perceived) over the other (Levelt, 1965). Whereas the MVP paradigm has been used to 
index attentional modulation by stimulu suppressed from awareness, the BR paradigm allows 
researchers to index unconscious processing via the speed or probability with which stimuli 
gain access to conscious perception. The logic is that if a threatening image is prioritized in 
the competition for awareness, it will be perceived for a larger proportion of a BR trial than a 
competing neutral stimulus. There is some evidence that dominance in BR is modulated by 
higher-level factors, such as object recognition (Yu & Blake, 1992) and surface organisation 
(Graf & Adams, 2008). However, low-level stimulus properties, such as higher contrast and 
luminance, also robustly increase stimulus dominance in BR (Levelt, 1965). The stimulus 
properties that increase perceptual dominance in BR are often referred to as determining 
‘stimulus strength’.    
During prolonged viewing periods, both rivalling images are likely to be perceived 
multiple times, as perception alternates between the two. This limits the extent to which 
dominance in BR reflects a purely unconscious processing advantage, since prolonged 
perception of a stimulus could be driven by conscious processes acting on the dominant 
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(visible) image. To address this issue, one can instead record which stimulus is the first to 
achieve perceptual dominance. This ‘first percept’ measure is considered more suited to 
investigating the early stages of perceptual selection, since only the initially dominant 
stimulus is reported (Carter & Cavanagh, 2007).   
Example study: Anderson, Siegal, Bliss-Moreau and Feldman Barrett (2011). 
The most cited BR study in our analyses was conducted by Anderson, Siegal, Bliss-
Moreau and Feldman Barrett (2011). Via an affective learning procedure, Anderson et al. 
(2011) associated neutral faces with descriptions of social behaviors that were negative (e.g. 
“he threw a chair at his classmate”), positive (e.g. “he gave up his seat on the bus to a 
pregnant lady”), or neutral (e.g. “he rode the elevator with a coworker”). In the subsequent 
BR task, one of the conditioned face images was presented to one eye, and an image of a 
house was presented to the other eye. Participants continuously reported their percept (face or 
house) over the 10-second rivalrous trial. Faces paired with negative social behaviors were 
perceived for significantly longer than the faces paired with positive or neutral social 
behaviors, or novel faces. The authors concluded that “what we know about someone 
influences not only how we feel and think about them, but also whether or not we see them in 
the first place” (p.1448). 
Breaking Continuous Flash Suppression (bCFS) Paradigm 
Description. 
Continuous flash suppression (CFS, Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005) is a variant of BR in 
which a stimulus presented to one eye is suppressed from awareness by a competing dynamic 
noise pattern presented to the other eye. Suppression during CFS is more potent than during 
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traditional BR (as defined by contrast detection thresholds; Tsuchiya, Koch, Gilroy, & Blake, 
2006). Temporally, the periods of suppression induced by CFS can last about 10 times longer 
than suppression induced by traditional BR (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). Another attractive 
property of CFS is that perceptual suppression of a target stimulus can reliably be induced 
from the onset of a trial. Thus, in comparison to traditional BR, CFS allows for more 
controlled, predictable and prolonged manipulations of awareness. 
  The relative strength of suppression induced by CFS may be due to a number of 
factors; the dynamic nature of the mask may reduce the neural adaptation that causes frequent 
perceptual switches in traditional BR (Shimaoka & Kaneko, 2011). Moreover, the 
spatiotemporal structure of the mask may exploit human sensory sensitivity; the mask can be 
selected to maximise human contrast and flicker sensitivity (Yang & Blake, 2012). It is 
currently disputed as to whether CFS constitutes a particularly robust form of binocular 
rivalry or whether it results from distinct mechanisms (Shimaoka & Kaneko, 2011). 
What can the bCFS paradigm tell us? How is this evidenced? 
A popular application of CFS has been to use the length of the initial suppression 
period in CFS as a correlate of the unconscious salience of the suppressed image. This is 
referred to as the breaking continuous flash suppression, or bCFS paradigm (the ‘b’ refers to 
‘breaking CFS - see Figure 4). Suppression duration is usually measured by the time it takes 
for an observer to report the presence or location of the initially suppressed stimulus whose 
contrast is increased over time. This is rooted in the similar assumption that is made about 
traditional BR: more salient stimuli gain access to awareness more quickly. Thus, as with BR, 
researchers have capitalized on the bCFS paradigm since it may offer insight into the 
competitive dynamics that underlie prioritized access to conscious perception. For instance, 
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to enable adaptive behavior, it might be predicted that threatening images would gain faster 
access to awareness than neutral images. The bCFS paradigm offers a means of testing this 
prediction. 
 
Figure 4. Schematic of typical stimuli, percepts and response options in a breaking 
continuous flash suppression (bCFS) paradigm. 
 
This paradigm offers several advantages over a conventional rivalry task in which 
dominance durations are compared for stimuli that compete for resources at the same time 
and in the same space. Firstly, the likelihood of mixed percepts and associated response 
biases are reduced (albeit not eliminated) as the trial ends as soon as an observer detects the 
target stimulus. Secondly, when the duration of percepts are compared between stimuli 
engaged in BR, it is hard to determine whether increased dominance is due to the salience of 
the dominant stimulus or the ineffectiveness of the suppressed stimulus. Instead, in bCFS, 
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response times are compared across different stimuli that compete against a common 
‘baseline’ dynamic masking pattern, making differential suppression times easier to interpret. 
Example study: Yang, Zald and Blake (2007). 
The most cited bCFS paper included in our analyses was conducted by Yang, Zald 
and Blake (2007). Yang et al. presented happy, fearful and neutral faces under CFS and 
recorded the time it took for participants to detect a face. Each trial consisted of a face 
presented at a random quadrant in one eye, whilst the CFS mask was presented to the other 
eye updating at a rate of 10Hz. Results showed that observers were faster at detecting the 
location of fearful than both happy and neutral expressions. The findings were interpreted as 
evidence that “negatively charged facial expressions gain preferential access to awareness” 
(p.885). 
Meta Analyses: Inclusion and Coding Decisions 
Inclusion Criteria 
All studies included in our analyses met all of the following criteria: 
1. The study used one of the following paradigms: masked visual probe, binocular 
rivalry, or breaking continuous flash suppression. 
2. The study was published as a journal article in the English language on or before 
March 31, 2015.   
3. A processing difference between threat-related and neutral stimuli could be assessed. 
Comparisons between neutral and “emotive” (a combination of positive and 
threatening) stimuli were excluded.  
4. The study was conducted on human subjects. 
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5. The study was not a re-analysis of existing data. 
6. Sufficient information was available for an effect size to be estimated (see “Meta 
Analysis: Methods”, section below). 
Other Coding and Inclusion Decisions 
 
1. Because anxiety has consistently been linked to increased processing biases for 
threatening stimuli (Bishop, 2007), we treated samples that were categorized as 
having high or low levels of self-reported anxiety as separate samples of observers. 
This allowed us to quantify the effects of anxiety as a moderator. When separate 
analyses were reported for two or more groups according to some other dimension or 
personality trait (e.g. carriers of a particular gene; Carlson, Mujica-Parodi, Harmon-
Jones, & Hajcak, 2012), the data were pooled into one sample.  
2. We excluded samples of patients that were reported to have a clinical diagnosis, 
unless this was an anxiety disorder. This was done to reduce unnecessary variance, as 
depression might be expected to modulate threat bias (Mogg et al.,1995; Mogg & 
Bradley, 2005), but there were insufficient data to reliably characterize effects of 
disorders other than anxiety. In practice, only 12 studies included in the analyses 
reported a depression measure, and these varied across studies (Beck Depression 
Inventory: Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961; Montgomery-Ashberg 
Depression Rating Scale: Montgomery & Asberg ,1979; Depression Anxiety Stress 
Scale; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1996).      
3. When studies involved a mood induction, therapeutic intervention or drug treatment 
expected to reduce or enhance threat-related biases (e.g. Maoz, Abend, Fox, Pine, & 
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Bar Haim, 2013), we only included experimental data collected prior to the 
intervention (at baseline), or from a control group. If there were no baseline data or 
control group, the study was excluded. 
4. If the study manipulated levels of threat intensity (e.g. by conditioning a threat image 
with an aversive event, or neutral event: Beaver et al., 2005), our effect size reflects 
the processing difference between the highest level of threat (i.e. the threat image 
paired with the aversive event) and a neutral stimulus.  
5. If studies used spatially inverted threat stimuli to control for low-level confounds (e.g. 
Yang et al., 2013), the corresponding data were excluded from our main analyses, 
since this manipulation reduces the recognizable emotional content of the stimulus 
(Gray et al., 2013). Instead, independent analyses were conducted to examine the 
effect of this manipulation on the magnitude of threat bias.  
6. If the study included a manipulation or degradation of stimuli that was not pertinent to 
our research question (e.g. spatial filtering: Stein, Seymour, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2013), 
we included only data corresponding to the un-manipulated (e.g. unfiltered) stimuli, to 
reduce unnecessary variance. 
7. If a study included a conditioning procedure, which assigned negative (CS+) and 
neutral valences (CS-) to stimuli, we excluded the data if the CS- was not intrinsically 
‘neutral’ (e.g. if the CS+ and CS- were both angry faces; Raes, Koster, Van Damme, 
Fias, & De Raedt, 2010). 
General Search and Coding Strategies 
The search for relevant studies and their coding was conducted by two authors (NH, 
KHLG). First, we conducted PubMed database searches. Second, we examined the reference 
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sections of all relevant literature reviews for additional studies. Third, we searched the 
reference sections of all qualifying articles and articles listed as citing the qualifying articles 
on Google Scholar. Database search terms, and a summary of the excluded articles are 
presented according to the ‘Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta 
Analysis’ guidelines (PRISMA; Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, Altman & Altman, 2009). The 
search terms and associated PRISMA flowcharts can be found in the supplementary material 
(supplementary material S2). 
Details of the coding / moderator variables used within each experimental paradigm 
are detailed in later sections. The inter-coder agreement between the two authors was high. 
We calculated the intra-class coefficients (ICCs) and kappa coefficients for the continuous 
and categorical moderators respectively. The ICCs were all 1.0 due to the straightforward 
nature of the continuous moderator data and the kappa coefficients ranged from 0.91 (for 
stimulus type) to 1.0 (for all other moderators). Rare disagreements were resolved via a 
discussion between the four authors.  
Meta Analysis: Methods 
Effect Size Metric 
The effect size index used for all outcome measures was Cohen’s d; the standardized 
difference between means (Cohen, 1977). In all cases, a positive value indicates a perceptual 
bias towards a threatening stimulus relative to a neutral stimulus.  
Standardizers for d 
 Our primary estimator of Cohen’s d was dz – the difference between means 
standardized by the standard deviation of difference scores. The advantage of this metric is 
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that it can be computed directly from just t, p or F values and the corresponding degrees of 
freedom (Lakens, 2013):  
 
zd =
t
N
  
   As our effects emanated from repeated measures designs, we also estimate an effect 
size estimate that corrects for the pre-post correlation (dRM) wherever possible (see 
supplementary material S3). 
In both cases (dz, dRM), the standard error was calculated via the generic formula: 
SE =
1
N + d2
2N
´ 2(1- r)  
If no exact t or p values were reported (e.g. “p < .05”), we either estimated the effect 
size from the available information, or, when necessary, excluded it from the analyses (see 
supplementary material S4). Additionally, we used two multiple imputation methods to 
estimate unreported values of moderator variables (see supplementary material S5). 
Regression imputation (RI) is ‘optimistic’ and uses the existing relationship between the 
reported moderator values and effect size to predict the unreported values. Conversely, 
random-sample imputation (RSI) is more conservative and assumes that missing values are 
random samples of the reported moderator values (i.e. the existing relationship is not 
predictive of the missing values).  
Model and Analysis Decisions 
We made an a priori decision to analyze our effect size data in a random effects 
model, due to its tolerance of heterogeneous effect sizes and conservative nature of 
estimation (Cumming, 2012). The random effects model assumes that each study estimates 
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different values from a distribution of population parameters, rather than assuming that 
studies are direct replications of each other (Schmidt, Oh, & Hayes, 2009). 
 We assessed heterogeneity across effect sizes by using Cochran’s Q and I2 statistics. 
Unless reported otherwise, parameter estimates were obtained via restricted maximum 
likelihood estimation, owing to its superior accuracy given a smaller number of studies 
(Lopez-Lopez, Marin-Martinez, Sanchez-Meca, Van den Noortgate, & Viechtbauer, 2014). 
Statistical tests of model coefficients were computed via Wald-type chi squared tests. We 
additionally used a pseudo-R2 statistic (Raudenbush, 1994) to assess the extent of effect size 
heterogeneity that was explained by moderators included in the model (see Supplementary 
material S6). Model comparisons were conducted via likelihood ratio tests. All analyses were 
conducted with the ‘metafor’ package (Viechtbauer, 2010) using the R programming 
language. 
Handling Dependency Amongst Effect Sizes 
For each paradigm, we explicitly coded the number of included conditions (nested 
within samples) and samples (nested within studies). Many of the samples were exposed to 
multiple conditions, which generates multiple effect sizes for these samples. For instance, in 
some cases, participants were exposed to more than one stimulus type (e.g. to fear and angry 
faces; Gray et al., 2013), meaning that this important moderator occurs at the within sample 
level and information would be lost by aggregating these effects. Thus, to minimize this 
information loss and increase statistical power, we used conditions, rather than samples as 
the unit of analysis in our models (k = conditions).  
When samples contribute multiple effect sizes in this way, the assumption of 
independence may be violated and bias the outcome of the meta-analysis, particularly if there 
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is anything unrepresentative about these samples (Matt & Cook, 2009; Rosenthal, 1991). To 
examine the influence of dependency on our results, we used two strategies. Firstly, we 
created multi-level models (see Cheung, 2014) wherein conditions (level 2) were nested 
within their samples (level 3). Because a structural equation modelling approach is used to 
estimate these models, this allowed us to specify interesting constraints that are otherwise 
very difficult to test. Using this approach, we were able to partition the heterogeneity between 
effect sizes into that occurring at level 2 (between conditions) or level 3 (between samples) 
and also statistically examine whether there was a significant amount of effect size 
dependency (i.e. does a 3 level model provide a significantly better fit than a 2 level model?). 
Secondly, we examined the influence of dependency via sensitivity analyses: using random 
selection procedures, we created data sets where dependency was eliminated by selecting one 
effect size per independent sample (Greenhouse & Iyengar, 1994). 
Meta Analysis: Results 
The MVP paradigm 
Summary of included data. 
Our inclusion criteria resulted in 28 MVP studies being analyzed, comprising 1407 
participants across 39 independent samples. We derived 44 estimates of the threat effect size. 
The coding system and summary of effects used in the analyses are shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
Detailed information about each included effect and demographic information can be found 
in the supplementary material (S7). 
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Dependent measures. 
 For the MVP paradigm, Cohen’s d reflects the difference in response time between 
valid and invalid cue trials. Positive values indicate that attention is biased towards the spatial 
location of threat-related stimuli (faster responses in valid trials). 
Overall effect size of threat-related bias. 
Figure 5 depicts the outcome of the MVP meta-analysis. A small, pooled effect of 
threat bias was detected (k=44, N= 1407, dz = 0.28, 95% CI [0.16 0.40], p < .001). The 
probability of superiority metric (Grissom & Kim, 2005) indicates that, after controlling for 
individual differences, the likelihood that a randomly sampled observer will respond faster to 
probes following threat relative to neutral stimuli is 58% [55% 61%]. The pooled effect 
remained significant when any single contributing effect was removed from the model (leave-
one-out analysis, all ps < .001). Moreover, Rosenthal’s ‘fail safe N’ (Rosenthal, 1991) 
revealed that the number of effects averaging null results required to render the pooled effect 
non-significant was 11251. Non-parametric ‘trim and fill’ analyses (Duval, 2005), did not 
suggest that any effects had been suppressed by publication bias (see also funnel plot in 
Figure 5b).
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Table 1 
Coding of Individual Effects in the MVP Paradigm. 
Moderator Type Values Description of variable / theoretical justification Descriptive 
statistics 
Missing 
cases 
Stimulus 
type 
Categorical 
 
1=fearful face 
2= angry face 
3= disgust face 
4=threatening 
word. 
5=IAPS image 
6 = fear 
relevant CS+ 
The type of threatening stimulus used in the experiment. Justification: The magnitude of threat bias may differ 
as a function of the semantic/physical properties of the stimulus. In addition, masking may not be equally 
effective for all stimulus types (Wiens & Ohman, 2007). 
 
k=44 
1=15 
2=17 
3=1 
4=8 
5=2 
6=1 
 
0 
SOA 
 
Continuous 
 
12-34 
 
Stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between presentation of the threat and mask stimulus. Justification: SOA is 
directly related to visibility/awareness of the target stimulus, which may modulate biases towards threat-stimuli. 
 
k=44 
M=20.89 
SD=8.07 
Range=12-34 
0 
Awareness 
measure 
Dichotomous 0=none 
1=objective 
How awareness of stimuli was assessed (with an objective awareness check, or with no awareness check). 
Justification: Previous research suggests that threat-related biases to briefly presented stimuli may be a function 
of the criteria used to assess awareness (Pessoa, Japee, Sturman, & Ungerleider, 2006). 
k=44 
0=26 
1=18 
0 
Probe 
response 
Dichotomous 1 = ‘where’ 
2 = ‘what’ 
The response that an observer is required to make to the visual probe in the response phase: ‘where’ tasks 
involve reporting the location of the probe (left or right), whereas ‘what’ tasks involve discriminating the 
probes’ orientation. Justification: Previous research has shown that these tasks are associated with different 
response times and error rates (Mogg & Bradley, 1999a). 
k = 44 
1 = 33 
2 = 11 
0 
hpwr Continuous 0.27-0.43 Metric that summarises the statistical power of objective awareness checks (see text). Justification: Awareness 
checks with low power increase the probability that target stimuli were not fully / always suppressed from 
awareness, i.e. deviations from chance performance in the awareness check may not be detected. This increases 
the likelihood that threat-related biases could be driven by a small proportion of undetected trials where the 
observer was aware of stimuli  (Hannula et al., 2007; Reingold, 2004). 
k=26 
M=0.38 
SD=0.06 
Range= 0.27-
0.43 
0 
Stimulus 
size 
Continuous 2.8-7.0 Diameter of the threat stimulus in degrees of visual angle. Justification: Affective processing of threat images 
may increase with stimulus size (Codispoti & Cesarei, 2007). Moreover, masking may not be as effective for 
larger stimuli (Wiens & Ohman, 2007). 
k=22 
M=5.3 
SD=1.4 
Range=2.8-
7.0 
22 
STAI-T Continuous 29.4-58.1 The samples’ mean trait anxiety level, as assessed by the Spielberger state-trait anxiety scale (Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). Justification: Anxiety is associated with enhanced processing biases 
towards threatening stimuli in visual probe tasks (Bar Haim et al., 2007). 
k=15 
M=41.34 
SD=8.85 
Range=29.4-
29 
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Table 2 
Summary of Effects Included in the MVP Analyses 
Study/Effect 
Sample 
code 
Condition 
code 
Exp N Stim SOA Aw meas 
Probe 
resp 
Hpwr VF Group 
Ret 
size 
STAI-T Pool ID 
1) Mogg et al., 1994 (i) 1 1 1 36 4 14 1 1 0.38 0 High Trait Anxious  42.4 0 
Mogg et al., 1994 (ii) 2 2 1 30 4 14 1 1 0.38 0 Low Trait Anxious  29.1 0 
2) Mogg et al., 1995 (i) 3 3 1 17 4 14 1 1 0.36 0 Clinical Anxiety  58.1 0 
Mogg et al., 1995 (ii) 4 4 1 15 4 14 1 1 0.36 0 Normal Controls  39.1 0 
3) Mogg & Bradley, 1999b (i) 5 5 1 33 2 17 1 1 0.41 1  2.9 42.0 0 
Mogg & Bradley, 1999b (ii) 5 6 1 / 2 17 1 1 0.41 2  2.9 39.0 0 
Mogg & Bradley, 1999b (iii) 6 7 3 22 2 17 1 1 0.43 1  2.9 39.0 0 
Mogg & Bradley, 1999b (iv) 6 8 3 / 2 17 1 1 0.43 2  2.9 42.0 0 
4) Mogg & Bradley, 2002 (i) 7 9 1 11 2 17 1 2 0.43 0 High Social Anxiety 4.5 43.7 0 
Mogg & Bradley, 2002 (ii) 8 10 1 16 2 17 1 2 0.43 0 Low Social Anxiety 4.5 33.9 0 
5) Fox, 2002 (i) 9 11 2 18 1 17 1 2 0.43 1 High Trait Anxious 5.7 50.4 0 
Fox, 2002 (ii) 9 12 2 / 1 17 1 2 0.43 2 High Trait Anxious 5.7 50.4 0 
Fox, 2002 (iii) 10 13 2 18 1 17 1 2 0.43 1 Low Trait Anxious 5.7 29.4 0 
Fox, 2002 (iv) 10 14 2 / 1 17 1 2 0.43 2 Low Trait Anxious 5.7 29.4 0 
6) Keogh et al., 2003 (i) 11 15 1 81 4 17 1 1 0.43 0    0 
7) Beaver et al., 2005 (i) 12 16 2 10 6 17 1 2 0.43 0 High-aversive group   0 
8) Hunt et al., 2006 (i) 13 17 1 55 4 17 1 1 0.43 0    0 
9) Koster et al., 2007 (i) 14 18 1a 49 2 34 1 1  0  6.7  0 
Koster et al., 2007 (ii) 15 19 2 24 2 34 1 1 0.27 0  6.7  0 
58.10 
 
Visual field Dichotomous 1=left 
2=right 
 
Location of threat stimulus: left or right visual field. Evidence suggests that affective perception may be 
lateralised, such that the right hemisphere may be particularly sensitive to emotional stimuli (Gainotti, 
Caltagirone, & Zoccolotti, 1993; Mormann et al., 2011). For this reason, some studies have split analyses 
according to the visual field threatening stimuli were presented in. 
k=10 
1=5 
2=5 
0 
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Koster et al., 2007 (iii) 16 20 3 19 2 14 1 1 0.27 0  6.7  0 
10) Murphy et al., 2007 (i) 17 21 1 12 1 17 0 2  0 Placebo control    0 
11) Stone & Valentine, 2007 (i) 18 22 1 24 2 17 1 1 0.39 0    0 
Stone & Valentine, 2007 (ii) 19 23 2 28 2 17 1 1 0.39 0    0 
12) Wirth & Schultheiss, 2007 (i) 20 24 2 52 2 12 0 1  0    0 
13) Schultheiss & Hale, 2007 (i) 21 25 1 52 2 12 0 1  0    0 
Schultheiss & Hale, 2007 (ii) 22 26 2 60 2 12 0 1  0    0 
14) Carlson & Reinke, 2008 (i) 23 27 1 30 1 33 0 1  0  6.0  0 
Carlson & Reinke, 2008 (ii) 24 28 2 30 1 33 0 1  0  6.0  0 
15) Monk et al., 2008 (i) 25 29 1 17 2 17 0 1  0 Generalised Anxiety Disorder   0 
Monk et al., 2008 (ii) 26 30 1 12 2 17 0 1  0 Control Group   0 
16) Carlson et al., 2009a (i) 27 31 1 12 1 33 1 1 0.31 1    0 
Carlson et al., 2009a (ii) 27 32 2 / 1 33 1 1 0.31 2    0 
17) Carlson et al., 2009b (i) 28 33 1 30 5 33 0 1  0  7.0  0 
18) Helzer et al., 2009 (i) 29 34 1 112 4 20 1 1  0    0 
19) Fox et al., 2010 (i) 30 35 1 104 5 14 0 2  0  4.0 40.1 0 
20) Carlson & Reinke, 2010 (i) 31 36 1 12 1 33 1 1  0  6.0  0 
21) Thomason et al., 2010 (i) 32 37 1 20 1 17 0 1  0 ll carriers   1 
Thomason et al., 2010 (ii) 32 37 1 31 1 17 0 1  0 s- allele carriers   1 
22) Sutton & Altarriba, 2011 (i) 33 38 2 64 4 30 0 2  0    0 
23) Carlson et al., 2012 (i) 34 39 1 40 1 33 1 1 0.32 0 SS allele 6.0  2 
Carlson et al., 2012 (ii) 34 39 1 10 1 33 1 1 0.32 0 L allele 6.0  2 
24) Carlson et al., 2013a (i)  35 40 1 40 1 33 1 1 0.32 0  6.0  0 
25) Carlson et al., 2013b (i) 36 41 1 15 1 33 1 1 0.32 0  6.0  0 
26) Maoz et al., 2013 (i) 37 42 1 24 3 17 0 2  0 Treatment group   3 
Maoz et al., 2013 (ii) 37 42 1 27 3 17 0 2  0 Control group   3 
27) McCrory et al., 2013 (i) 38 43 1 40 2 17 0 1  0    0 
28) Carlson et al., 2014 (i) 39 44 1 55 1 33 1 1 0.32 0  6.0  0 
Note. Dashes indicate that the sample is the same as the preceding row. 
Pool ID is a coding variable that indicates the effects that are pooled together into one sample. 
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Figure 5. a): Forest plot of effects from the MVP analyses, error bars are 95% confidence 
intervals. Dotted red line is the pooled summary effect, shaded region is the 95% confidence 
interval b) Funnel plot. Dotted line is pooled effect size. Coloured contours represent p values 
(Black: =1, Red=.05, Yellow=.01, Blue=.001, Green= .0001, Orange= .00001, 
Purple=.000001).  
 
Substantial heterogeneity was detected (Q(43) = 151.24, p <.001). The I2 statistic 
indicated that 77% of the heterogeneity between studies could not be accounted for by 
sampling variability, justifying the use of the random effects model. Fifty-eight percent of 
heterogeneity was located at the between condition level and only 19% was located at the 
between sample level. Moreover, a 3-level, nested model did not provide a better fit to the 
data than a traditional 2 level model (LRT= 0.249, p = .618), suggesting the influence of 
dependency was limited. To explain this heterogeneity across threat-related biases, we 
examined the influence of moderators, which are summarized in Table 1.  
Regression models with one moderator. 
A summary table of the one-moderator models and plots of all main effects can be 
found in supplementary material (S8). 
An effect of stimulus type was detected (Q(5)= 13.78, p =.017) and including this 
moderator in the model accounted for 24.34% of the total heterogeneity among effects. There 
was a large bias for fearful faces (dz = 0.58, [0.37 0.78], p<.001) but significant pooled biases 
were not detected for any other stimulus types (see Figure 6a). Fearful faces yielded larger 
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biases than angry faces, disgust faces and word stimuli (ps <.05). No other significant 
differences between stimulus types were detected.  
 The distribution of SOAs between target stimulus and mask was bimodal, so we 
dummy coded SOAs as either long (30, 33, or 34ms) or short (12, 14, or 17ms). A main 
effect of this factor was detected (Q(1)= 9.23, p= .002) and this moderator accounted for 
29.10% of the heterogeneity in effects: threat-related biases were significantly larger at 
longer SOAs (see Figure 6b).  
No difference was detected between studies that did vs. did not include an objective 
awareness check (Q(1)= 0.04, p=.834).  To assess the statistical power of objective awareness 
checks, we used the effect size index Cohen’s h (the arcsine transformed difference between 
chance performance and a target level of above-chance performance; Cohen, 1977). To 
summarize power in a single metric (hpwr), we calculated the largest value of h that each 
awareness check would be underpowered to detect (by assuming power of 79% to detect at 
the a = .05 level). In other words, this analysis asks, “what is the upper limit of discrimination 
performance that participants could attain in the awareness check, but still be classified as 
‘unaware’?”. The mean value of hpwr was 0.37 (SD = 0.06) - a small-to-medium effect size. In 
practice, this means that, on average, it is accepted that participants are objectively unaware 
of stimuli if 2AFC performance is less than 68%, i.e. up to 18% above chance level. 
Meta-regression detected no evidence that hpwr predicted the magnitude of threat 
related bias (Q(1)=0.32, p=.856 (RI: b = 0.02, [-0.08 0.12], p = .694, RSI: b = 0.02, [-0.09 
0.12], p = .754). Thus, although awareness checks were lacking in statistical power, and 
threat biases are larger with long SOAs, these data do not provide direct evidence that threat 
related biases can be attributed to undetected deviations from chance performance. However, 
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given the low variability in hpwr values across studies (range 0.27 – 0.43), and the limited 
number of effects that had an associated objective awareness check (k= 26), limited power 
exists to detect this potential relationship.  
Trait anxiety levels were reported for 15 effects. Anxiety was entered as a continuous 
predictor of the corresponding threat-biases via meta-regression (Figure 6c), revealing that 
elevated anxiety is associated with larger threat bias (b=0.03, R2=37.18%, p = .008; RI: b = 
0.02, [0.01 0.04], p = .016; RSI: b = 0.01, [-0.01 0.03], p = .234). The model indicated that 
threat-related biases would reduce to statistical non-significance for samples with STAI-T 
scores below 40. However, when restricting our analyses to samples whose anxiety levels 
were unreported, a small threat bias was still detected (dz =0.25, 95% CI [0.12, 0.39], 
p<.001). 
Across 22 effects, we found no evidence that stimulus size modulated effect sizes 
(b=0.04, R2 = 0.00, p =.624, RI: b = 0.02, [-0.08 0.12], p = .694; RSI: b = 0.02, [-0.09 0.12], p 
= .754). We also found no evidence that probe response modulated effect sizes (Q(1) = 0.14, 
p = .708). Pooled effect sizes were of similar magnitude in the ‘where’ (dz = 0.26, [0.12 0.40], 
p<.001) and ‘what’ versions of the task (dz=0.32, [0.07 0.57], p=.013). Five studies split their 
analyses by visual field, yielding 10 effects. No effect of visual field was detected (Q(1) = 
1.93, p = .165). However, when left and right visual field were analyzed separately, threat-
related biases were only statistically significant for stimuli presented in the left visual field 
(left: dz=0.68, [0.23 1.15], p=.003, right: dz=0.23, [-0.21 0.68], p=.304 ). 
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Figure 6. Random effects models with (a) stimulus type, (b) SOA and (c) STAI-T as the sole 
moderator. Shaded grey region is the 95% CI. Size of points is inversely proportional to the 
standard error of the effect (larger = more precision). 
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Models with two-way interactions. 
Models with two-way interactions are summarized in the tables and figures in 
supplementary material S8. An interaction was detected between stimulus type and STAI-T 
(Q(2)=15.13, p<.001); the threat biases elicited by all stimuli had a positive association with 
STAI-T, but the slope was largest for angry faces, then fearful faces and words. The 
interaction between awareness measure and SOA was marginally significant (Q(1)=3.73, 
p=.054), such that the effect of SOA on threat bias was greater when no awareness check was 
conducted. We did not test for higher order interactions due to low numbers of observations 
and empty cells in some moderator categories. 
Multiple regression models 
We used multiple regression to determine the model that optimally explained the 
heterogeneity in effects. Only main effects were included since interactions were either non-
significant, or involved a substantially reduced number of effects. This also enhanced the 
interpretability of our final model. We used a backward elimination strategy, starting with a 
model that contained all moderators, then eliminating moderators consecutively on the basis 
on their p value. Since competing models differed in terms of the number of coefficients, we 
used maximum likelihood estimation to compare models via likelihood ratio tests (LRT). 
Complete effects models.  
We first analyzed models where moderators were reported for all effects (k=44: 
complete effects models). These moderators (the only ones with no missing values) were 
stimulus type, awareness measure, SOA and probe response. The backward elimination 
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strategy revealed that the optimal complete effects model included only stimulus type and 
SOA as predictors, accounting for 31.72% of the heterogeneity in effects (see Figure 7).  
Reduced effect models. 
We next evaluated the influence of additional moderators that were only reported for 
a subset of effects, by including only effects for which these moderator values were reported 
(reduced effects models). The predictors hpwr (k=26) stimulus size (k=22) and visual field (k = 
10) did not significantly improve the model fit, but STAI-T (k=15) did (LRT=9.73, p=.002).  
Model comparisons with imputed data. 
Using RI to estimate the missing data, the best fitting model included stimulus type, 
SOA and STAI-T, and accounted for 52.50% [31.23 74.11] of the heterogeneity among 
effects. However, with RSI, STAI-T did not significantly improve model fit. 
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Figure 7. Predicted effect sizes from the final model, plotted as a function of actual 
(observed) effect sizes. Shaded region is 95% confidence interval. The panel shows the 
relative importance of each predictor (normalised contribution to R2 across all orderings of 
regressors). 
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Sensitivity analyses. 
As noted earlier, some of the effects in our model shared a sample with another effect. 
The outcome of our analyses may therefore be biased if the samples contributing multiple 
effects were unrepresentative (Greenhouse & Iyengar, 1994). We therefore constructed two 
new data sets using random selection procedures such that no independent sample contributed 
more than one effect size to the model (k=39). The pooled effect sizes were dz = 0.29 [0.16 
0.42], p<.001 and dz = 0.23 [0.11 0.34], p<.001 for the first and second random selections 
respectively, and these datasets both resulted in the same final model (including stimulus type 
and SOA), following multiple regression. This further suggests that the presence of shared 
samples / dependency did not substantially bias our analyses. 
Summary of MVP findings.  
In the MVP paradigm, we detected a small threat bias when effect sizes were pooled. 
A substantial amount of heterogeneity was explained by the type of stimulus, the SOA 
between stimulus and mask and the observers’ state anxiety. 
i) Threat stimuli are not equally prioritised. 
The threat related bias is predominantly attributable to fearful faces. Notably, we 
detected no threat related bias for any other individual stimulus type. Removing fearful faces 
from the analysis nearly halved the magnitude of the pooled effect dz=0.15 [0.05 0.24], 
p=.004. 
ii) Stimulus visibility may modulate threat related biases 
 The data provide indirect support for the idea that stimulus visibility moderates threat 
related biases: effects were substantially larger when the SOA between target and mask was 
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>30 ms. Importantly, studies using stringent signal detection criteria show that the majority of 
observers can reliably detect stimuli when they are masked with an SOA of ~30ms (Pessoa, 
Japee, Sturman, & Ungeleider, 2006). Furthermore, the interaction between awareness 
measure and SOA approached statistical significance - the effect of SOA on threat-bias was 
greater when there was no awareness measure. This further suggests that inadequate 
awareness measures combined with partial stimulus visibility could have contributed to the 
observed threat effects in several studies. Another interpretation of the moderating effect of 
SOA is that a brief presentation may degrade processing of a masked stimulus in general, 
thereby reducing effect sizes, regardless of whether this results in visibility or not. However, 
irrespective of whether effect sizes are moderated by awareness of the stimuli, or simply by 
the strength of visual signals, either possibility illustrates the methodological issues 
associated with using brief presentations to manipulate awareness. 
iii) Awareness was not carefully measured in all studies.  
  Eighteen effects were not associated with any awareness check to verify the efficacy 
of the masking procedure and so cannot make strong categorical claims about genuinely 
‘unconscious’ processing. Furthermore, power analyses revealed that objective awareness 
checks were underpowered to detect small to medium deviations from chance performance. 
Thus, in many cases, type II errors (failure to detect awareness) may have occurred.  
iv) Threat related biases are related to, but not dependent on high anxiety levels. 
 Our analyses generally support the proposed link between attentional bias to masked 
threat and anxiety. However, the data do not strongly suggest that preconscious threat-related 
biases require high anxiety levels - a robust threat-related bias was observed in samples for 
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which levels of anxiety were not reported, but are likely to converge around healthy 
population means. 
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Binocular Rivalry 
Summary of included data. 
Fourteen binocular rivalry (BR) studies (comprising 788 subjects in total) were 
included in our analyses. These studies reported data from 22 independent samples, providing 
31 effect size estimates. The coding system and summary of the included effects are 
displayed in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. Detailed information on each effect size and 
demographic information can be found in the supplementary material S9. 
Dependent measures. 
 
 For the BR paradigm, a positive value of d reflects prioritized perceptual selection of 
threatening stimuli over neutral stimuli. The first dependent measure we refer to as total 
dominance, which is defined by the difference between threatening and neutral stimuli in 
terms of the proportion of total trial time (within rivalry trials) that each was perceptually 
dominant (e.g. Alpers & Gerdes, 2007). The second outcome measure is initial dominance, 
which is summarised by the difference between threat and neutral stimuli in terms of the 
proportion of rivalry trials on which each was reported as the first percept (e.g. Gray, Adams, 
& Garner, 2009).  
Overall effect of threat-related bias.   
Figure 8 displays the main meta-analytic results. A medium effect of threat bias was 
detected (k=31, N= 788, dz= 0.47, 95% CI [0.30 0.63], p < .001). After controlling for 
individual differences, this is consistent with a 68% [62% 74%] chance that a randomly 
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sampled observer will perceive threatening stimuli longer/ more frequently than neutral 
stimuli. The effect remained statistically significant when any single effect was removed 
(leave-one-out analyses, all ps < .001). Rosenthal's fail-safe N indicated that 1559 effects 
averaging a null result would be required to reduce the pooled effect to non-significance. 
Trim and fill analyses did not suggest the suppression of null effects (see funnel plot, Figure 
8b). 
 
 Substantial heterogeneity was detected (Q(30) = 165.33, p <.001). The I2 statistic 
indicated that 83% of the heterogeneity between effects could not be accounted for by 
sampling variability. The vast majority of heterogeneity (82%) was located at the between 
condition level, and only 1% was located at the between sample level. Moreover, a 3 level, 
nested model did not provide a better fit to the data than a traditional 2 level model (LRT= 
.001, p = .972), suggesting virtually no influence of dependency on effect sizes. We 
examined the influence of several moderators to explain this heterogeneity (Table 3). 
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Table 3 
Coding System for Individual Effects in the BR Paradigm 
Moderator Type Values Description / theoretical justification Descriptive 
statistics 
Missing 
cases 
Stimulus 
type 
Categorical 
 
1=fearful face 
2=angry face 
3=disgust  
4=conditioned 
neutral face 
(CS+)  
5=grating (CS+) 
6= IAPS/ 
pictorial 
Type of threatening stimulus presented in the rivalry trial. Justification:  The magnitude of threat 
bias in rivalry may differ as a function of the semantic/physical properties of the stimulus categories  
k=31 
1=13 
2=7 
3=4 
4=2 
5=2 
6=3 
0 
Dominance 
measure 
 
Dichotomous 
 
1= total 
dominance 
2= initial 
dominance 
 
Whether the effect reflects initial dominance (which stimulus is perceived first) or total dominance 
(which stimulus is perceived for the longest time over the course of a trial). Justification: These are 
thought to partially reflect separate processes. In initial dominance, the observer’s only response is 
the first stimulus they perceive. This initial percept thus reflects only the ‘bottom up’ early stages of 
perceptual selection. However, with total dominance, both stimuli alternate in awareness, thus it is 
difficult to infer whether increased perception of threat stimuli is due to unconscious processes (i.e. 
processes acting on a suppressed threat stimulus), or contamination from periods of conscious 
evaluation during dominance periods (i.e. processes occurring when the threat stimulus is visible; 
Carter & Cavanagh, 2007). 
k=31 
1=20 
2=11 
0 
Design Dichotomous 0 = offline 
1 = online 
Whether threatening and neutral images competed in rivalry in the same trial (online) or across trials 
via a ‘baseline’ stimulus (offline). Justification: Differences between concurrently presented stimuli 
determine rivalry dominance.  It is not known whether these effects are transitive, thus the two 
designs may produce different effect sizes.   
k= 31 
0= 20 
1= 11 
0 
Stimulus 
size 
Continuous 1-11.5 The diameter of the threat stimulus in degrees of visual angle. Justification: Affective processing of 
threat images may vary over stimulus size (Codispoti & Cesarei, 2007). Moreover, larger stimuli 
increase the likelihood of piecemeal rivalry (mixed percepts, in which elements of both rivalling 
stimuli are visible; Blake, O’Shea, & Mueller, 1992). 
k=26 
M=6.09 
SD=4.34 
Range= 1-11.5 
5 
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Rivalry 
trial length 
Continuous 8-60 Variable representing the length of the rivalrous period. Justification: Across shorter trials, 
dominance proportion will be more tightly correlated with first percepts. With longer trial lengths, 
each stimulus will have be perceived more times, given that the number of perceptual switches are 
inversely proportional to the length of the rivalrous period.  
k=20 
M=34.80 
SD=21.82 
Range=8-60 
0 
STAI-T Continuous 27.9-50.5 The sample’s mean trait anxiety level, as assessed by the Spielberger state-trait anxiety scale (ref). 
Justification: Anxiety is consistently linked with processing biases towards threatening stimuli (Bar 
Haim et al., 2007). 
k=17 
M=40.49 
SD=5.95 
Range=27.9-
50.5 
 
14 
Stimulus 
inversion 
Dichotomous 1=upright 
2=inverted 
 
Whether the threat stimulus is presented upright, or spatially inverted. Justification: Spatial inversion 
can impair recognition of the emotional content of stimuli, but leave low-level properties such as 
contrast, luminance and spatial frequency unchanged (Gray et al., 2013). Thus, if threat, or emotion 
were the primary determinant of the processing biases, we would expect these to be reduced, or 
altered when stimuli are inverted. Conversely, if low-level properties are the primary determinant, 
we would expect equivalent threat related biases for both the upright and inverted configurations. 
k=12 
1=6 
2=6 
0 
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Table 4 
Summary of Effects Included in the BR Analyses 
Study/Effect 
 
Samp
le 
code 
Cond
ition 
code 
Exp N Stim Dom 
meas 
Ret 
Size 
Tria
l len 
Online Group STAI-
T 
Stim inv 
1) Alpers et al., 2005 (i) 1 1 1 31 4 1 1.31 8 0  42.60 1 
      Alpers et al., 2005 (ii) 2 2 2 30 4 1 3.00 14 0  40.70 1 
2)   Alpers & Pauli, 2006 3 3 1 46 5 1 9.50 30 1  40.58 1 
3)   Alpers & Gerdes, 2007 (i) 4 4 1 30 1 1 9.05 15 1  39.90 1 
      Alpers & Gerdes, 2007 (ii) 4 5 1 / 2 1 9.05 15 1   1 
      Alpers & Gerdes, 2007 (iii) 5 6 2 22 2 1 1.00 8 1   1 
4)   Bannerman et al., 2008 (i) 6 7 1 27 1 1 11.50 60 1   1 
      Bannerman et al., 2008 (ii) 7 8 3 20 1 1 11.50 60 0   1 
      Bannerman et al., 2008 (iii) 7 I1 3 / 1 1 11.50 60 0   2 
5)   Yoon et al., 2009 (i) 8 9 1 38 3 1 1.90 60 1   1 
      Yoon et al., 2009 (ii) 9 10 2 78 3 1 1.90 60 1   1 
      Yoon et al., 2009 (iii) 9 11 2 / 3 2 1.90  1   1 
6)   Gray et al., 2009 (i) 10 12 1 19 1 2 2.15  1  42.95 1 
      Gray et al., 2009 (ii) 10 13 1 / 2 2 2.15  1   1 
      Gray et al., 2009 (iii) 10 I2 1 / 1 2 2.15  1   2 
      Gray et al., 2009 (iv) 10 I3 1 / 2 2 2.15  1   2 
7)   Amting et al., 2010 (i) 11 14 1 16 1 2   1   1 
      Amting et al., 2010 (ii) 11 15 1 / 3 2   1   1 
8)   Anderson et al., 2011 (i) 12 16 1 57 6 1 1.50 10 0   1 
      Anderson et al., 2011 (ii) 13 17 2 41 6 1 1.50 10 0   1 
9)   Bannerman et al., 2011 (i) 14 18 1 30 2 1 3.25 60 0 Younger adults  1 
      Bannerman et al., 2011 (ii) 14 I4 1 / 2 1 3.25 60 0 Younger adults  2 
      Bannerman et al., 2011 (iii) 14 19 1 30 2 1 3.25 60 0 Older adults  1 
      Bannerman et al., 2011 (iv) 14 I5 1 / 2 1 3.25 60 0 Older adults  2 
10) Ritchie et al., 2012 (i) 15 20 1 18 1 1 5.95 60 0   1 
      Ritchie et al., 2012 (ii) / I6 1 5 1 1 5.95 60 0   2 
11) Lerner et al., 2012 (i) 16 21 1 11 1 1  36 0   1 
12) Singer et al., 2012 (i) 17 22 1 16 1 2 11.50  0 Control group 27.90 1 
      Singer et al., 2012 (ii) 17 23 1 / 1 1 11.50 40 0   1 
      Singer et al., 2012 (iii) 18 24 1 16 1 2 11.50  0 Social anxiety group 50.50 1 
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      Singer et al., 2012 (iv) 18 25 1 / 1 1 11.50 40 0   1 
      Singer et al., 2012 (v) 19 26 1 14 1 2 11.50  0 Panic disorder group 43.11 1 
      Singer et al., 2012 (vi) 19 27 1 / 1 1 11.50 40 0   1 
13) Anderson et al., 2013 (i) 20 28 1 152 2 1  10 0  38.52 1 
      Anderson et al., 2013 (ii) 20 29 1 / 2 2   0   1 
14) Gerdes & Alpers., 2014 (i) 21 30 1 20 5 2 4.00  0 Control group 37.35 1 
      Gerdes & Alpers., 2014 (ii) 22 31 1 21 5 2 4.00  0 Phobic group 41.47 1 
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Figure 8. a): Forest plot of effects from the BR analyses, error bars are 95% confidence 
intervals. Red dotted line is the pooled summary effect, shaded red region is the 95% 
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confidence interval b) Funnel plot. Coloured contours represent p values (Black: =1, red=.05, 
yellow=.01, Blue=.001, Green= .0001, Orange= .00001, Purple=.000001).  
 
Regression models with one moderator. 
A table and figure summary of all main effects can be found in the supplementary 
material S10. 
Stimulus type (including fearful, angry and disgust faces, international affective 
picture system (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) images, conditioned neutral faces 
and conditioned gratings) was detected as a significant moderator of threat related biases 
(Q(5)= 13.24, p = .021), accounting for 29.92% of the total heterogeneity among effects (see 
Figure 9a). Moderate to large effects for fearful faces (dz = 0.73, [0.50 0.97], p<.001), disgust 
faces (dz= 0.47, [0.11 0.83], p=.014) and IAPS images (dz= 0.66, [ 0.20 1.12], p=.005) were 
detected. Fearful faces and IAPS images yielded larger threat-related biases than angry faces 
(ps <.050). No other differences between stimulus type were detected. 
The dominance measure (total, initial) was a marginally significant moderator of 
threat-related bias (Q (1) =3.08, p = .079, see Figure 9b) accounting for 6.86% of 
heterogeneity. A moderate effect for total dominance was detected (dz= 0.57, [0.37 0.77], 
p<.001), whereas initial dominance effects were small (dz= 0.27, [0.00 0.54], p=.048).  
 An effect of design was also detected (Q(1) = 4.01, p =.045, see Figure 9c), 
accounting for 12.96% of heterogeneity, such that online designs (dz=0.68, [0.41 0.95], 
p<.001) yielded larger threat-related biases than offline designs (dz =0.35, [0.15 0.54], 
p=.001). 
ARE VISUAL THREATS PRIORITISED WITHOUT AWARENESS?  
 
We were able to determine stimulus size for 26 effects. This predictor was marginally 
significant (see Figure 9d): larger stimuli produced larger threat related biases (observed: 
b=0.039, R2=12.81%, p=.058; RI: b=0.038 [-0.004 0.081], p=.075; RSI: b=0.032, [-0.011 
0.076], p=.140).  
 
Figure 9. Main effects for the BR paradigm. Random effects models with (a) stimulus type 
(b) dominance measure (c) design (d) or stimulus size as the sole moderator. 
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Trait anxiety levels were available for 17 effects. No effect of anxiety on the size of 
the threat bias was detected (observed: b=0.008, R2=0.00, p=.657; RI: b=0.007, [-0.033, 
0.047], p=.716; RSI: b=0.006, [-0.031, 0.043], p=.744). Across the 20 total dominance 
effects, no effect of trial length on the magnitude of threat-related bias was detected 
(b=0.003, R2=0.00, p=.525). 
 
Models with two-way interactions. 
 Plots and tables summarizing all interactions can be found in supplementary material 
S10. An interaction between trait anxiety and design was detected, such that anxiety was 
more strongly associated with threat bias in offline designs (b=-0.30, Q(1)=4.25, p=.039). 
The interaction between stimulus size and BR task was marginally significant (b=-0.07, 
Q(1)=3.40, p=.065) such that the positive association between stimulus size and threat 
related bias was larger in total than initial dominance effects.  
To examine the effect of spatial inversion on threat related bias, in a separate model 
we combined data from conditions where threat-related biases were reported for both upright 
and spatially inverted stimuli (k=12, only available for fearful and anger stimulus types). 
Although inversion reduced the threat bias (upright: dz=0.32, inverted: dz=0.13), this was not 
a significant main effect (Q(1)=0.68, p=.409). Critically, however, we detected an interaction 
between stimulus type and inversion (Q(1)=3.93, p = .047); contrasts revealed that inversion 
significantly reduced biases for fearful faces (Q(1)=4.55, p = .033) but not angry faces 
(Q(1)=0.31 p = .580). 
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Multiple regression models. 
Complete effects models. 
Our full model contained three predictors: stimulus type, dominance measure and 
design, since these were the only moderators with no missing values. The backward 
elimination strategy and likelihood ratio tests indicated that this model was significantly 
better than models with any of these predictors removed and was thus retained as the final 
model (See Figure 10). The model accounted for 74.70% of the heterogeneity in effects.  
Reduced effects models. 
 Reduced effect models that included stimulus size (k=26), trial length (k=20) or state 
anxiety (k=17) were not significantly better than the full model with three predictors. 
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Figure 10. Predicted values from the final model, plotted as a function of actual (observed) 
data. Shaded region is 95% confidence interval. The panel shows the relative importance of 
each predictor (normalised contribution to R2 across all orderings of regressors). 
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Model comparisons with imputed data. 
After using both RI and RSI to estimate the missing values for stimulus size, trial 
length and state anxiety, the best fitting model was unchanged. 
Sensitivity analyses. 
We constructed two new data sets using random selection procedures such that no 
sample contributed more than one effect size to the model (k=22). The pooled effect sizes 
were dz = 0.60, [0.41 0.78], p <.001 and dz = 0.56, [0.37 0.75], p<.001 for the first and second 
random selections respectively, and these resampled datasets resulted in the same final 
model, following multiple regression. This suggests that the presence of shared samples did 
not substantially bias our analyses.  
Summary of BR findings.  
For the BR paradigm, we detected a moderately-sized overall threat bias that was 
larger than that found with the MVP paradigm. A model containing the type of stimulus, the 
dominance measure and design as moderators provided a good fit to the data. 
i) Stimulus type. 
Similarly to the MVP paradigm, the size of the threat bias depended on the type of 
stimulus; in both the MVP and BR paradigms, fearful faces produced a large and highly 
reliable effect. Strikingly, in both MVP and BR paradigms, the effect produced by angry 
faces was significantly smaller, and not significantly different from zero.   
Fearful faces were the most widely used threat stimulus in the BR paradigm 
(contributing 42% of our analyzed effects), whilst some other stimulus categories (e.g. IAPS) 
were sparsely represented, limiting the precision of their effect size estimates. 
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ii) Effects are smaller for initial than total dominance. 
 The initial dominance is thought to be a more objective measure of the unconscious 
perceptual selection of stimuli in the competition for awareness than total dominance (Berry, 
1969; Gray et al., 2009; Ooi & He, 1999). Because total dominance is quantified from 
alternating perception of threatening and neutral stimuli, both conscious (during dominance 
of threat) and unconscious processes (during suppression of threat) could contribute to these 
effects. Our analyses revealed that total dominance effects were larger than initial dominance, 
suggesting that threat related biases in BR are strongly modulated by conscious processing. 
iii) Stimulus size.  
There is good evidence that rivalry occurs within spatially localized regions (e.g. 
Kovacs et al., 1996). This can lead to piecemeal rivalry for larger stimuli: perception is not 
exclusively of one stimulus or other, but a mixed patchwork of the two. Piecemeal rivalry 
may actually become more prevalent than global rivalry when stimuli are large; the optimum 
stimulus size for whole-image rivalry is less than 1 degree of visual angle (DVA; Blake et al., 
1992). Generally, the stimuli presented in the BR studies were considerably larger than this 
(the mean stimulus size was 6 DVA in diameter), suggesting that piecemeal rivalry may have 
occurred frequently. This, in turn, increases the risk of response biases and criterion effects, 
since these are more likely to come into play during the ambiguous, mixed perceptual states 
in piecemeal rivalry. For instance, a threatening stimulus may be reported as the dominant 
percept because it has more behaivoural relevance and is more noticeable to an observer, 
when in fact local regions of both threat and neutral stimuli are visible. Our data provide 
some support for this - there was a marginally significant association between stimulus size 
and threat related bias. Moreover, stimulus size was more predictive of threat related bias in 
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total dominance tasks than initial dominance tasks (stimulus size x dominance measure 
interaction). This further suggests that mixed perception may play a role; mixed perception 
often occurs at the time of perceptual switches, which are lacking in paradigms that only 
measure the first percept (i.e. initial dominance).  
iv) Experimental design 
The design (offline vs. online) was predictive of threat related biases: online designs 
yielded larger effects than offline designs. Importantly, in online designs, when competing 
images (e.g. a fearful face and neutral face) are presented simultaneously, they may not 
satisfy a necessary condition of binocular rivalry: that the images presented to each eye are 
sufficiently different. In particular, if the faces are matched in terms of identity and, more 
importantly, orientation (as in, for example, Alpers & Gerdes, 2007, Amting et al., 2010) they 
may be binocularly fused, with the resultant percept differing from neutral. Thus, fusion may 
prompt an observer to report that a threatening stimulus is dominant, when in fact no rivalry 
occurred at all. Indeed, one experiment with an online design (Bannerman et al., 2008, 
Experiment 2a-which we excluded from our analyses) reported that when aligned fearful and 
neutral faces were presented dichoptically, observers did not experience any rivalry.  
v) Binocular rivalry and anxiety. 
 Some studies included in our analyses have suggested a positive association between 
anxiety and threat bias in BR (Gray et al., 2009; Singer et al., 2012). This was not consistent 
across all studies, and unlike the MVP analyses, our meta-regression did not detect a 
relationship between trait anxiety and threat dominance overall. Some studies reported no 
difference in threat bias between anxious and non-anxious populations (Alpers & Gerdes, 
2007; Anderson et al., 2013). Another showed larger threat biases for anxious populations, 
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relative to controls in initial dominance, but effects in both directions in total dominance, 
depending on the specific diagnosis (Singer et al., 2012). Although our analyses detected no 
main effect of anxiety, the relationship between anxiety and rivalry may be a function of the 
dominance measure, stimulus type, and specific diagnosis. More data will be needed to 
clarify this relationship. 
Breaking Continuous Flash Suppression 
Summary of included data. 
Fourteen bCFS studies (comprising 501 subjects) were included in the analyses. 
These studies reported data from 18 independent samples, providing 27 effect size estimates. 
The coding system and summary of the included effects are displayed in Tables 5 and 6 
respectively. Details of how each effect size was computed can be found in the 
supplementary material S11. 
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Dependent measures. 
For the bCFS paradigm, a positive value of d indicates prioritized detection of 
threatening stimuli from CFS. In almost all cases, the dependent measure was response time, 
where a positive value indicates faster detection of threatening stimuli (e.g. Yang et al., 
2007). In other cases, a positive value indicates more accurate localization of threat stimuli 
following shorter, fixed duration CFS trials (indexed by accuracy in forced choice responses- 
see Hedger, Adams, & Garner, 2015; Oliver, Mao & Mitchell, 2014). 
Overall effect of threat-related bias. 
 Figure 11 displays the main meta-analytic results for the bCFS paradigm. Across all 
effects, the pooled effect size was small, negative and non-significant (k= 27, N= 501, dz = -
0.14, [-0.45 0.17], p= .376). After controlling for individual differences, this is consistent 
with a 44% chance that a randomly sampled observer will perceive threatening stimuli faster/ 
more efficiently than neutral stimuli. Trim and fill analyses did not suggest the suppression of 
any unpublished effects (see funnel plot, Figure 11b). The test for heterogeneity was 
significant (Q (26)= 252.56, p <.001 and the I2 statistic indicated that nearly all the 
heterogeneity across effects (94%) was due to factors other than sampling variability. For 
heterogeneity, 33% was located at the between condition level and 61% was located at the 
between sample level. However, a 3 level nested model did not provide a significantly better 
fit than a traditional two level model (LRT= 2.61, p=.187). We examined the influence of 
several moderators to explain this heterogeneity (Table 5). 
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Table 5 
Coding System for Individual Effects in the bCFS Paradigm 
Moderator Type Values Description / theoretical justification Descriptive 
statistics 
Missing 
cases 
Stimulus 
type 
Categorical 1= Fearful face 
2= Angry face 
3= Disgust face 
4= Dominant face 
5= Untrustworthy 
face 
6 = Word 
7 = Pictoral/ IAPS 
Type of threatening stimulus presented in the CFS trial. Justification:  The magnitude of threat bias 
in CFS may differ as a function of the semantic/physical properties of the stimulus categories 
k=27 
1 = 10 
2 = 3 
3 = 3 
4 = 4 
5 = 4 
6 = 2 
7 = 1 
0 
Stimulus 
size 
Continuous Range = 1.15- 5.20 The diameter of the threat stimulus in degrees of visual angle. Justification: Affective processing of 
threat images may vary over stimulus size (Codispoti & Cesarei, 2007). Moreover, a large stimulus 
size increases the likelihood of piecemeal rivalry (mixed percepts, in which elements of both 
stimulus and mask are visible; Blake et al., 1992). 
k = 22 
M = 3.03 
SD = 0.92 
Range = 1.7 – 
5.20  
7 
Awareness 
measure 
Dichotomous 1= Response time 
2 = Localisation 
accuracy 
The measure by which an observer’s detection of stimuli from CFS is identified Justification: 
Response times may comprise multiple components- a motor component (i.e. the time taken to press 
a button), a perceptual component (the time it takes for a stimulus to reach awareness) and a 
decisional component (the time it takes to use the available information to determine that the 
stimulus is visible). Un-speeded forced-choice localisation tasks are less affected by the motor and 
decisional components, since response latencies are not diagnostic. 
k=27 
1 = 24 
2 = 3 
0 
Stimulus 
inversion 
Dichotomous 1= Upright 
2=Inverted 
Whether the threat stimulus is presented upright, or spatially inverted. Justification: Spatial inversion 
can impair recognition of the emotional content of stimuli, but leave low-level characteristics such as 
contrast, luminance and spatial frequency unchanged (Gray et al., 2013). The logic of this 
manipulation is that if low-level properties were the cause of a threat bias, one might expect a similar 
sized bias for upright and inverted stimuli. Conversely, if threat sensitive processes were the cause of 
a threat bias, we would expect a threat bias in an upright configuration, but not in an inverted 
configuration. 
k=  18 
1 = 9 
2 = 9 
0 
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Table 6 
Coding System for Individual Effects in the bCFS Paradigm 
 
Study/Effect 
 
Samp
le 
code 
Cond
ition 
code 
Exp N Stim Ret 
Size 
Aw meas Group Stim inv 
1) Yang et al., 2007 (i) 1 1 1 12 1 1.9 1  1 
Yang et al., 2007 (ii) 1 I1 1 / 1 1.9 1  2 
Yang et al., 2007 (iii) 2 2 2 12 1 1.9 1  1 
Yang et al., 2007 (iv) 2 I2 2 / 1 1.9 1  2 
2) Sterzer et al.,2011 (i) 3 3 1 20 1 2.0 1 Control group 1 
3) Sylvers et al., 2011 (i) 4 4 1 87 1 3.4 1  1 
Sylvers et al., 2011 (ii) 4 5 1 / 3 3.4 1  1 
4) Yang & Yeh, 2011 (i) 5 6 1 12 6 2.0 1  1 
Yang & Yeh, 2011 (ii) 5 I3 1 / 6 2.0 1  2 
Yang & Yeh, 2011 (iii) 6 7 2 12 6  1  1 
Yang & Yeh, 2011 (iv) 6 I4 2 / 6  1  2 
5) Chen & Yeh., 2012 (i) 7 8 1 30 1 5.2 1  1 
6) Stein & Sterzer, 2012 (i) 8 9 1 16 2 2.0 1  1 
7) Stewart et al., 2012 (i) 9 10 1 23 4 3.4 1  1 
Stewart et al., 2012 (ii) 9 11 1 / 5 3.4 1  1 
Stewart et al., 2012 (iii) 10 12 2 21 4 3.4 1  1 
Stewart et al., 2012 (iv) 10 13 2 / 5 3.4 1  1 
Stewart et al., 2012 (v) 11 14 3 28 4 3.4 1  1 
Stewart et al., 2012 (vi) 11 15 3 / 5 3.4 1  1 
8) Gray et al., 2013 (i) 12 16 3 41 2 2.5 1  1 
Gray et al., 2013 (ii) 12 17 3 / 1 2.5 1  1 
Gray et al., 2013 (iii) 12 I5 3 / 2 2.5 1  2 
Gray et al., 2013 (iv) 12 I6 3 / 1 2.5 1  2 
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9) Stein et al., 2014a (i) 13 18 1 12 1 3.5 1  1 
Stein et al., 2014a (ii) 13 I7 1 / 1 3.5 1  2 
10) Capitao et al., 2014 (i) 14 19 1 46 1 1.7 1  1 
11) Oliver et al., 2014 (i) 15 20 1 40 1  2  1 
Oliver et al., 2014 (ii) 15 21 1 / 3  2  1 
Oliver et al., 2014 (iii) I1 I9 2 39 1  2  2 
Oliver et al., 2014 (iv) I2 I10 2 / 3  2  2 
12) Getov et al., 2014 (i) 16 22 1 36 4  1  1 
Getov et al., 2014 (ii) 16 23 1 / 5  1  1 
13) Jusyte et al., 2015 (i) 17 24 1 24 1 2.7 1 Control Group 1 
Jusyte et al., 2015 (ii) 17 25 1 / 3 2.7 1  1 
Jusyte et al., 2015 (iii)  17 26 1 / 2 2.7 1  1 
14) Hedger et al., 2015 (i) 18 27 1 29 7 5.2 2  1 
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Regression models with one moderator. 
A table and figure summary of all main effects can be found in the supplementary 
material S12. Stimulus type (including fearful, angry and disgust, dominant and 
untrustworthy faces, negative words and IAPS images) was detected as a moderator of threat 
related biases (Q(6)= 41.32, p <. 001), accounting for 65.38% of the total heterogeneity 
among effects (see Figure 11a). A moderate positive bias was detected for fearful faces (dz = 
0.49, [0.17 0.82], p<.001), whereas large, negative biases were detected for dominant faces 
(dz = -0.96, [-1.47 -0.44], p<.001), untrustworthy faces (dz = -0.68, [-1.18 -0.17], p=.008), and 
negative words (dz = -1.69, [-2.58 -0.79], p<.001). Fearful faces yielded larger biases than 
dominant and untrustworthy faces and negative words (all ps<.001). The pooled effect for 
negative words was significantly smaller than for angry faces, disgust faces and IAPS images 
(all ps<.002).  
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Figure 11. Forest plot of effects, error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Red dotted line is 
the pooled summary effect, shaded red region is the 95% confidence interval b) Funnel plot. 
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Coloured contours represent p values (Black: =1, red=.05, yellow=.01, Blue=.001, Green= 
.0001, Orange= .00001, Purple=.000001). 
 
No effect of stimulus size (observed: b=-0.180, R2=0.00, p=.379; RI: b=0.007, [-
0.033, 0.047], p=.716; RSI: b=0.006, [-0.031, 0.043], p=.744) or awareness measure was 
detected (Q(1)= 0.192, p = .661). 
Models with two-way interactions. 
 Plots and tables summarising all interactions can be found in supplementary material 
S12. No interactions involving stimulus type, stimulus size or awareness measure were 
detected. To observe the effect of spatial inversion on threat related bias, in a separate model, 
we combined data from conditions where threat-related biases were reported for both upright 
and spatially inverted stimuli (k=18). Inverted stimuli actually yielded larger threat related 
biases (upright: dz=0.15, inverted: dz=0.34) although the main effect of inversion was not 
significant (Q(1)=0.816, p=.367). Critically, we detected an interaction between stimulus 
type and inversion (Q(1)=12.811, p = .005, see Figure 12b ), i.e. inversion had a differential 
effect on threat-related bias depending on the stimulus type. Contrasts revealed that threat-
related biases for fear (p=.837) and anger (p=.372) faces did not differ significantly between 
upright and inverted configurations, but inversion was associated with significantly larger 
effect sizes for disgust faces (p=.044) and negative words (p<.001).  
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Figure 12. a) Random effects model with stimulus type as the sole moderator. b) Model 
depicting the interaction between stimulus type and stimulus inversion. 
Models with multiple moderators. 
Complete effects models. 
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Our full model contained two predictors: stimulus type and awareness measure, since 
these were the only moderators with no missing values. The backward elimination strategy 
eliminated awareness measure, meaning that the best fitting model included only stimulus 
type, as described above (Figure 12a). 
Reduced effects models. 
 A reduced effect model that included stimulus size (k= 22) did not significantly 
improve the model fit. 
Model comparisons with imputed data. 
 Using both imputation methods, the best-fitting model remained unchanged. 
Sensitivity analyses. 
We constructed two new data sets using random selection procedures such that no 
sample contributed more than one effect size to the model (k=22). The pooled effect sizes 
were dz=0.09, [-0.27 0.47], p=.618 and dz 0.06, [-0.30 0.43], p =.725 for the first and second 
random selections respectively, and these resampled datasets resulted in the same final model 
(including just stimulus type), following multiple regression. This suggests that the presence 
of shared samples did not substantially bias our analyses.  
Summary of bCFS findings.  
In our analysis of the bCFS literature, we estimated a very small, negative, non-
significant effect of threat related bias. Although many studies provided significant effects, 
there was substantial heterogeneity, with many effect sizes being strongly positive or strongly 
negative. 
i) Evidence for reversed threat biases. 
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Some aspects of the data were similar to the MVP and BR paradigms. Again, fearful 
faces yielded threat-biases that were substantially larger than other stimulus categories. 
However, unlike these paradigms, a striking discrepancy was observed in that we found 
evidence for substantial reversed biases for some threat stimuli: negative word stimuli, and 
dominant and untrustworthy faces were slower to break suppression than their neutral 
counterparts. In addition to conflicting with the data from other paradigms, these findings 
conflict with the basic notion that unconscious threat processing is concerned with expediting 
the processing and perception of threatening stimuli to promote survival.   
ii) Low-level confounds may explain some threat-related biases. 
Contrary to our findings for the BR paradigm, we found that biases for fear and angry 
faces were indistinguishable between upright and inverted configurations. In fact, the pooled 
effect was slightly larger for inverted configurations. Given that inversion reduces the 
recognizable threat content of facial expressions, but maintains their low-level image 
properties (Gray et al., 2013), this provides good evidence that detection 
advantages/disadvantages for these stimuli may be mainly attributed to low-level properties 
such as contrast and spatial frequency content - factors known to affect rivalry dominance 
(Baker & Graf, 2009), rather than threat sensitive processes.
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Discussion 
Summary of outcomes 
The primary goal of our meta-analysis was to examine the extent to which 
unconsciously presented threatening stimuli are prioritized in visual processing, relative to 
neutral stimuli. Our analyses revealed evidence for a small pooled threat-prioritization effect 
in the MVP paradigm, a medium effect in the BR paradigm and inconsistent effects in the 
bCFS paradigm.  
Differences between paradigms 
The three paradigms we reviewed did not only yield pooled effects of different 
magnitude, they were also modulated by different variables, affirming our decision to analyse 
them separately. This is perhaps unsurprising, because the three paradigms differ with respect 
to how they disrupt normal visual processing (Breitmeyer, 2015). Research indicates that 
brief, masked presentations interfere with awareness by impeding the temporal integration of 
neural responses to successive stimuli (Kovacs, Vogels, & Orban, 1995). In contrast, BR is a 
complex multi-stage phenomenon, comprising of low-level, interocular inhibitory 
components (Tong & Engel, 2001; Tong, Meng, & Blake, 2006) and higher-level effects that 
increase the depth of suppression along the ventral processing stream (Nguyen, Freeman, & 
Alais, 2003). The strength of suppression induced by CFS is also more potent than BR, as 
demonstrated by sensitivity measurements (Yang & Blake, 2012). Moreover, masking and 
CFS differ with respect to how they attenuate neural responses in the dorsal and ventral 
processing streams (Almeida, Mahon, Nakayama, & Caramazza, 2008). For instance, there is 
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an ongoing discussion about whether CFS spares processing via the dorsal ‘vision for action’ 
pathway relative to masking (Hebart & Hesselman, 2012). Such a difference might provide 
an a priori expectation that stimuli presented under CFS are more likely to elicit behavioral 
responses. These different suppression mechanisms should therefore be expected to differ 
with respect to how they restrict the neural representation of threat-relevant stimuli. 
It is also important to consider that the MVP paradigm may reflect a different visual 
selection process to BR and bCFS. During BR, awareness alternates between two retinally 
co-located images presented to the two eyes. In contrast, in attentional cuing tasks, attending 
to a stimulus at one location impairs discrimination of a stimulus at another location, but does 
not, in itself, cause it to disappear from awareness. However, although selective attention and 
interocular suppression clearly have different perceptual consequences, they may engage 
common competitive mechanisms. For instance, Mitchell, Stoner and Reynolds (2004) found 
that cuing attention to a surface engaged in rivalry enhanced its dominance. Similarly, Ooi 
and He (1999) found that a stimulus is more likely to become dominant if accompanied by a 
salient ‘pop out’ cue. Human brain imaging also shows that the activation of regions involved 
in attentional switching and perceptual switching in BR are similar (Knapen, Brascamp, 
Pearson, van Ee & Blake, 2011). Indeed, behavioural evidence shows that in the absence of 
attention there are no variations in consciousness that define binocular rivalry (Brascamp & 
Blake, 2012). Thus, despite apparent differences, biases observed in BR and MVP paradigms 
may be governed by a similar neural competition process that is prompted by rival stimulus 
representations. In this context, it is notable that when controlling for the differences in 
stimuli that have been used in each paradigm, the data are broadly consistent. When 
considering only those stimuli that have been used in all three paradigms (fear faces, andgry 
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faces, disgust faces, and IAPS images), effect sizes are not moderated by paradigm (Q(2) = 
2.37, p = .036) and there is no interaction between stimulus and paradigm (Q(6) = 2.48, p = 
.870).  
Which threat stimuli receive prioritized processing? 
One other interesting finding was the existence of strong reversed biases for some 
threatening stimuli in the bCFS paradigm: neutral stimuli were consistently prioritized over 
negative words, untrustworthy and dominant faces. These findings conflict with the basic 
notion that when encountering threat, its privileged processing is beneficial (Nesse, 1999). 
Stewert and colleagues (2012) propose a framework to account for these discrepancies by 
suggesting that indirect threats (e.g. fearful faces) may induce fight or flight responses and 
heighten cortical arousal to reduce suppression of threat stimuli, whereas direct threats (e.g. 
angry faces, dominant faces) may also produce passive responses, characterized by ‘freezing’ 
and reduced cortical arousal, which may prolong suppression of threat. However, this 
framework cannot accommodate the reversed bias for negative words, which are not direct 
threats, nor can it accommodate for the lack of reversed biases for directly threatening stimuli 
in the BR and MVP paradigms. At any rate, whereas freezing behaviors and physiological 
changes have adaptive properties in the context of threat (reducing detection by predators, 
conserving energy) these should not be conflated with actively suppressing the perception of 
threatening stimuli, which seems maladaptive. In fact, freeze responses in many mammals are 
associated with hypervigilance to threat cues that prime a subsequent fight or flight reaction 
(Campbell, Wood & McBride, 1997).  
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One finding that was consistent across all three paradigms was that fearful faces 
elicited the largest, most reliable threat related biases (MVP: dz = 0.56, BR: dz = 0.58, bCFS: 
dz = 0.49). In fact, it is worth noting that removing fearful faces from the analysis 
substantially reduced the pooled effect size in each paradigm (MVP: 0.28 to 0.15, BR: 0.47 to 
0.31, bCFS: -0.04 to -0.50). This sensitivity to fear is consistent with a large body of 
neuroimaging literature which has demonstrated that fear faces elicit responses in threat 
sensitive brain regions, even when suppressed by masking (Whalen et al., 2004), BR (Pasely, 
Mayes, & Schultz, 2004) and CFS (Jiang & He, 2006). Another commonality worth noting is 
that in all three paradigms, angry faces produced substantially smaller, non-significant, and 
even negative effects (MVP: 0.11, BR: 0.08, bCFS: -0.07). This is somewhat surprising, 
given that angry faces signal a direct threat to an observer (“I am angry”), whereas fearful 
faces only indicate the presence of a threat (“I am afraid”). It is hard to explain why an 
effective threat detection system would have the capacity to prioritise an indicator of threat in 
the environment (a fearful face), without similar sensitivity to stimuli that are directly 
threatening (an angry face). One possibility is that fearful faces are more salient on a purely 
sensory level, and that this is a better predictor of their enhanced processing than their effect 
on threat sensitive processes (Gray et al., 2013; Lee, Susskind & Anderson, 2013). We 
discuss to this possibility in the following section. 
Low level confounds 
In our bCFS analyses, we found that biases for some stimulus categories (e.g. fearful 
faces) did not differ between upright and inverted configurations. Recent reports have shown 
that inverted facial expression, while retaining luminance, contrast and spatial frequency 
profile, have vastly reduced recognizable emotional content, according to signal detection 
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and implicit measures (Gray et al., 2013) and also valence, arousal and dominance ratings 
(Hedger, Adams, & Garner, 2015b). Therefore, the fact that the detection advantage for 
fearful over neutral faces is equivalent in magnitude between upright and inverted 
configurations suggests that simple low-level variability between expressions may drive this 
effect.t  Given that i) inversion reduces the recognizable emotional content of stimuli, and ii) 
it does not alter low-level stimulus properties (contrast, luminance, spatial frequency profile), 
the similar magnitude of threat bias in upright and inverted configurations suggests that 
simple low-level variability between fearful and neutral faces may explain the threat related 
bias. This more parsimonious explanation negates the need to invoke unconscious threat 
sensitive processes. It is notable that very few MVP studies have attempted to control for 
low-level stimulus properties (the exceptions being Carlson & Reinke, 2008; and Fox, 2002). 
This is important, since if stimuli differ on some other dimension other than their perceived 
threat, it cannot unequivocally be claimed that perceived threat is the cause of the processing 
bias unless adequate controls are implemented.  
 Recently, it has been reported that the prioritised detection of fearful faces from 
backward masking and CFS is poorly explained by perceived threat (valence arousal and 
dominance ratings) and is better explained by low-level stimulus characteristics - the 
distribution of luminance contrast across spatial frequency in relation to the human contrast 
sensitivity function (Hedger et al., 2015b). In particular, several authors have noted that the 
increased luminance contrast associated with the greater exposure of iris and scleral field in 
the fear expression may be a good predictor of their prioritized detection over neutral faces 
(Lee, Susskind, & Anderson, 2013). Notably, this suggests a purely sensory detection 
advantage that can occur independently of threat, or emotion sensitive processes. Given that 
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i) fearful faces were the most commonly used stimuli in conditions contributing to our 
analyses and ii) these conditions contributed the largest effect sizes to the pooled estimate, 
this is a non-trivial issue.  
Assessment of awareness and response criteria. 
 In the MVP analyses, we found evidence that awareness moderates threat related 
biases: effects were substantially larger when the SOA between target and mask was 
increased to > 30 ms. This is particularly important, given evidence that observers can 
reliably detect stimuli that are presented for this duration when stringent, signal detection 
criteria are used to assess awareness (Pessoa, Japee, & Ungerleider, 2005; Pessoa, Japee, 
Sturman & Ungerleider, 2006). Furthermore, many MVP studies did not include any explicit 
awareness check to verify the efficacy of the masking procedure, which substantially limits 
the validity of strong conclusions about ‘unconscious’ processing on the basis of these 
observations.  
Related, but separable concerns are applicable to the assessment of awareness in the 
BR and bCFS paradigms. In BR, the perceptual switches between stimuli are not always well 
defined and discrete, making it difficult to reliably measure which stimulus is dominant at 
any one time. Although some studies have included a ‘mixed-percept’ response option to 
address this issue (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007; Lerner et al., 2012), the boundary between 
perception of one image and another in rivalry is often graded and temporally uncertain 
(Knapen et al., 2011). Thus, regardless of the available response options, perceptual reports 
are still heavily reliant on an observer’s individual criteria in classifying when one image is 
(primarily) dominant or the percept is mixed (Pessoa, 2005). It is possible, for example, that 
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response biases could inflate effect sizes, if a threatening stimulus is reported when elements 
of both threatening and neutral images are visible.  
 Similarly, response times in bCFS tasks reflect a ‘pure’ suppression duration, during 
which none of the target stimulus is visible, but can also reflect the time taken, and criterion 
used, to report that a stimulus has become visible. This concern is particularly pertinent when 
one considers that several studies included in our analysis did not include a non-CFS control 
condition to verify that there were no inherent differences in detectability of threatening vs. 
non-threatening stimuli under suprathreshold conditions (Capitao et al., 2014; Chen & Yeh, 
2012; Gray et al., 2013; Justyte et al., 2015; Stein et al., 2013; Sylvers et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, even in the cases where such a control has been included, this typically consists 
of presenting identical stimuli to both eyes (Sterzer et al., 2011; Stewart et al., 2012), which 
may not be perceptually comparable. For instance, response times are highly variable in a 
bCFS task, due to the stochastic temporal dynamics of BR (Lahky, 1995), whereas in a non-
CFS control condition, the appearance of a target whose contrast is linearly increased is more 
easily anticipated (Stein, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011). Since the target stimulus and mask are 
simply superimposed in control tasks, there is also the absence of partial stimulus visibility 
that can occur during perceptual switches in binocular rivalry, including CFS. Thus, such 
control tasks are not comparable and may not be equipped to rule out the influence of 
response biases. We must be cautious, therefore, in interpreting differential response times in 
bCFS studies as solely reflecting unconscious processing.    
Threat-related biases and anxiety 
Evidence for a relationship between anxiety and threat-related bias varied across 
paradigms. We found strong evidence for a relationship between trait anxiety and threat bias 
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in the MVP paradigm, but evidence for this association in the BR paradigm was more mixed, 
with both affirmative (Gray et al., 2009, Singer et al., 2012) and null findings (Alpers & 
Gerdes, 2007; Anderson et al., 2013). In the bCFS paradigm, we identified only one study 
that included an anxiety measure, which prevented meta-analytic examination. Measurement 
of threat biases in anxious populations could be complicated by the fact that anxious 
observers are less capable of discriminating between threatening and neutral signals (Lissek 
et al., 2009) and often interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening (Clark & McManus, 2002) 
as a consequence of a lowered threshold for perceiving threat (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). 
Indeed, Lee, Kang, Kim, and An (2008) note that neutral faces may provide an inappropriate 
baseline in studies of emotion processing, since they may be evaluated as negative, 
depending on the experimental context and the observer.  
Another possibility is that anxiety is only associated with enhanced threat biases when 
stimulus presentation is brief; our BR analyses revealed that the association between anxiety 
and threat bias was stronger in the initial dominance measure (although the anxiety x 
dominance measure interaction did not reach significance). In keeping with this, evidence 
from the visual probe paradigm has suggested an anxiety-enhanced bias towards threat at 
short presentations, but this is less reliable at longer stimulus presentations (Mogg & Bradley, 
2006; Mogg, Philppot, & Bradley, 2004). Moreover, in clinically anxious populations, threat 
related biases have been found to be larger in subliminal than supraliminal versions of the 
emotional Stroop task (Bar Haim et al., 2007). Eye movement data also indicate that threat 
biases in anxiety are typically observed during the initial phases of stimulus presentation (e.g. 
first fixations; Calvo & Avero, 2005; Mogg, Garner, & Bradley, 2007). These observations 
are broadly consistent with cognitive models of anxiety, which posit that selective attention 
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for threat is mediated by mechanisms operating early in information processing (Williams, 
Watts, Macleod, & Mathews, 1997). 
Future directions 
Our review reveals a number of topics that, in our view, warrant further investigation. 
Dissociating awareness, stimulus degradation and suppression. 
Firstly, there is a need for a more refined, systematic investigation of the 
representation of subliminal stimuli. To optimally study unconscious threat processing, a 
paradigm should manipulate awareness and not any other aspect of visual processing. 
However, all known methods for rendering stimuli invisible do so by making them drastically 
different from a consciously viewed counterpart. Thus although suppression methods allow 
experimenters to ‘switch awareness off’, they likely do so by attenuating the gain of neural 
responses and degrading the strength of visual signals, relative to consciously viewed stimuli 
(Yuval-Greenberg & Heeger, 2013). It has been argued, for instance, that binocular rivalry 
may not be optimally suited for studying visual consciousness, since it may have unique 
neural mechanisms that do not generalize to other stimulus conditions and perceptual 
phenomena (Blake, Brascamp & Heeger, 2014). Therefore, it remains possible that other 
paradigms may eliminate awareness, but spare visual processing to the extent that threat 
responses remain effective. Testing a range of suppression paradigms that rely on different 
mechanisms, will allow more reliable dissociation of null effects resulting from the genuine 
absence of unconscious threat-sensitive process from those resulting from methodological 
limitations (e.g. Faivre, Berthet & Koudier, 2012).  
On a related note, the extent to which ‘dominance’ and ‘suppression’ in BR and CFS 
are functionally the same as ‘awareness’ and ‘unawareness’ remains an empirical question. 
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Under some conditions, participants may retain some residual sensitivity to, or phenomenal 
awareness of stimuli in the suppression phase. For instance, colors of objects suppressed 
under rivalry can nonetheless appear as a diffuse “cloud” superimposed on the dominant 
image (Hong & Blake, 2009), and suppressed, drifting grating can still give an impression of 
movement, when only the dominant image is visible (Zabood, Lee & Blake, 2011). 
Moreover, when two flickering forms engage in rivalry, they can be temporally integrated 
into ‘beats’, despite observers only being conscious aware of one form (Carlson & He, 2000). 
These examples of ‘stimulus fractionation’ are widespread in the rivalry literature and 
suggest that fusion and rivalry can co-occur, such that some aspects of a stimulus may be 
suppressed (form) but other may be fused (color, motion, temporal information).  
Are threat stimuli comparable? 
A common criticism of meta analyses is that researchers combine different types of 
studies in a single analysis (i.e. the problem of “apples and oranges”, Bornstein, 2009). For 
instance, combining the data from individual studies that use either fearful or dominant faces 
(as in the case of the bCFS analyses) yields a threat related bias that is near zero, but the does 
not adequately characterize the effect elicited by each stimulus. However, meta analyses 
allow us to quantify these differences despite the fact that these stimuli were not directly 
compared within the same empirical study. Given the substantial heterogeneity explained by 
stimulus type in all three paradigms, we should question the extent to which all stimuli 
defined as threatening are truly comparable.  
Though both fearful and dominant faces may be threatening, fearful faces may be 
perceived as a salient threat of physical harm in the mearby environment, whereas dominant 
faces may be perceived as more nuanced threat to social status. At the behavioral level, 
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reacting to a fearful face may require a fast behavioral response, whereas responding to a 
dominant face may promote submissive withdrawal and behavioral adjustments related to 
longer term risk assessment. Indeed, at the neural level, researchers have differentiated 
between systems for responding to ‘potential threat’ and ‘imminent danger’ (Fiddick, 2011). 
As a result, a more refined characterization of threatening stimuli is required in future 
research. This could include a number of important dimensions that may modulate the threat 
response, such as the proximity (Mobbs et al., 2007), predictability (Whalen et al., 2007) or 
directness (Adams et al., 2011) of the threat and the psychological state of the observer 
(Bishop 2007).  
A related recommendation is that experimental methods should routinely test the 
crucial possibility that stimuli intended to be threatening or neutral may simply not be 
perceived as such by participants. This problem may arise because self-report rating can be 
influenced by distortions such as social norms and the investigators’ expectations (Dagleish 
& Power, 1999). Indeed, implicit measures of valence have been shown to be inconsistent 
with self report measures and may reveal that observers judge both ‘neutral’ and ‘threatening’ 
categories as being broadly similar in valence (e.g. Lee et al., 2008). As implicit measures are 
relatively immune to response bias, they could be used in place of, or in conjunction with self 
report measures.  
What kind of awareness matters? 
The research literature that we have reviewed consists of paradigms that disrupt 
normal visual processing so that awareness can be studied. It has been argued that although 
this type of awareness is interesting, it is not particularly relevant to understanding the impact 
of threatening stimuli on behavior and clinical conditions such as anxiety (Pessoa, 2013). The 
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primary reason cited for this position is that “subliminal stimuli do not occur naturally” 
(Bargh & Morsella, 2008, p. 78). Whilst this claim seems unfalsifiable, it is clear that we do 
not, outside of the lab, often encounter a 10Hz stimulus presented to just one eye, or isolated 
faces images that are masked after only 17 milliseconds. For this reason, Bargh and Morsella 
propose that studying unawareness of the influence of a stimulus is more important to 
understanding human behavior than the unawareness of a stimulus itself. Although a 
reasonable concern, it is also true that stimuli can also be rendered invisible in more typical 
circumstances than those induced by BR and masking. For instance, the majority of traffic 
accidents can be attributed to inattention and forms of perceptual blindness (Chun & Marois, 
2002). Visual crowding and motion-induced blindness are other instances where stimuli are 
rendered invisible, but under conditions that are likely to occur frequently in cluttered and 
dynamic natural scenes (Bonneh, Cooperman, & Sagi, 2001; Koudier, Berthet, & Faivre, 
2011). Using these paradigms may prove informative and allow conclusions to more readily 
be generalized to typical viewing conditions. 
Interocular suppression and anxiety  
Although there have been studies into the efficacy of pharmacological and cognitive 
interventions to modulate threat related biases in anxious individuals using the MVP 
paradigm (Maoz et al., 2013; Murphy et al, 2008), this has not been done using BR and 
bCFS. This is somewhat surprising, since there is good evidence that perceptual switches in 
binocular rivalry are linked to the balance of inhibitory neurotransmitters (van Loon et al., 
2013), prefrontal cortex activity (Amting et al., 2010) and attentional control (Carter et al., 
2005; Paffen & Alais, 2011); all of which have been implicated in maladaptive perceptual 
biases in anxiety and considered therapeutic treatment targets (Bishop, 2009; Eysenck, 
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Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). There are therefore, potential gains from applying well 
controlled versions of these tasks to investigate maladaptive biases in threat processing in 
anxiety. For instance, early investigations with the bCFS paradigm appear to show some 
sensitivity to self-reported anxiety (Capitao et al., 2014) and other social trait characteristics 
(Stewart et al., 2012). 
What drives threat-related biases? 
A major limitation of the ‘threat’ literature is that it is often unclear whether sensory 
or affective dimensions of stimuli drive their prioritised processing (Adams, Gray, Garner & 
Graf, 2011). The claim that perceived threat is the cause of a processing bias is crucial to the 
logic of many of studies, but is often based on assumption, rather than empirical evidence. It 
is important to control for, or at least explicitly characterize, the influence of low-level 
stimulus properties. One way to circumvent the issue of low-level confounds is to pair 
perceptually similar stimuli (pairs of neutral faces, simple gratings) with negative and neutral 
valences, via fear conditioning/ affective learning. Two studies in our meta analysis 
employed this technique (Alpers et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2011) and observed evidence 
for a threat-related bias even when low-level confounds were eliminated via this method. 
Similarly, we would suggest that control stimuli (such as spatially and contrast inverted 
faces) provide a good means of dissociating sensory and affective factors (e.g. Gray et al., 
2013). In addition to controlling for low-level stimulus properties, future studies could 
systematically measure affective dimensions of stimuli, via perceived valence, arousal and 
dominance ratings (Hedger et al., 2015b). This would allow a more detailed, precise and 
standardized examination of the relative contribution of low-level and affective factors.  
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Relating behavioral and neuroimaging measures 
Neuroimaging techniques have the potential to reveal the neural signatures and brain 
regions underlying unconscious threat processing. For instance, there is considerable 
evidence that the amygdala is an important component of the neural circuitry involved in 
threat processing (for a review see Adolphs, 2008). However, patients with amygdala lesions 
nonetheless show prioritized processing of threat stimuli in a wide range of behavioral tasks 
(Tsuchiya, Moradi, Felsen, Yamazaki, & Adolphs, 2009; Piech et al., 2010; Piech et al., 
2011). It therefore remains an interesting question as to whether amygdala activity to 
unconsciously presented faces has a causal role in driving threat responses, or whether it is 
simply correlated with the processing of threatening stimuli. Thus, whilst these neuroimaging 
findings are invaluable in many respects, they are more easily interpretable when combined 
with sensitive, well-controlled behavioral measures of enhanced threat processing. 
When a procedure (e.g. masking) prevents conscious awareness, but behavioral 
evidence for threat processing is detected, it is often concluded that threat processing 
temporally precedes awareness, or that it is ‘preconscious’ (Fox et al., 2010; Mogg et al., 
1995, Sylvers et al., 2011). However, the rapidity of stimulus presentation is not related to the 
rapidity of processes under study (Vanrullen, 2011). Restricting presentation time directly 
affects the quality of visual input or equivalently, the signal to noise ratio. It is possible that 
conscious awareness requires more robust visual input than threat processing, but the two 
processes occur at similar latencies when the signal to noise ratio is sufficient. Thus, effects 
generated by subliminal stimuli do not shed light on the relative speeds of the two processes. 
This is important, given that one of the proposed advantages of unconscious threat processing 
is that it is faster than general purpose visual processing (Tamietto & deGelder, 2010), but the 
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evidence for this component of the standard hypothesis is very mixed (Pessoa, 2010). This 
issue may be investigated with further studies using electrophysiological methods with fine 
temporal resolution, although it is currently unclear whether responses at ‘deep’ (subcortical) 
brain structures can be reliably estimated via EEG or MEG (Baumgartner, Pataraia, 
Lindinger, & Deecke, 2000). 
 Awareness measures and response bias  
To clarify whether threat related biases are genuinely independent of awareness, 
future MVP studies could assess the relationship between stimulus visibility and threat bias 
by parametrically varying the SOA between target and mask. Recent work applying this logic 
to studying explicit and implicit measures of affective processing has revealed that these are 
strongly dependent on visibility/ the SOA (Lahteenmaki, Hyona, Koivisto, & Nummenmaa, 
2015). Ideally, signal detection awareness measures would be employed concurrently with 
the visual probe trials in a manner that corrects for individual response bias. Researchers 
could also conduct a priori power calculations to determine the number of trials required for 
a sensitive awareness check. At a minimum, this could be calculated post hoc to assess the 
likelihood of type two errors. 
 Response biases were identified as an issue for BR and bCFS studies. To combat the 
issue of response biases, some researchers have implemented non-rivalrous simulations that 
attempt to mimic piecemeal rivalry, by alternating the transparency of regions of 
superimposed images, with the temporal dynamics of these alternations drawn from rivalry 
data (Baker & Graf, 2009; Lee & Blake, 2004). Since no rivalry is involved, similar 
simulations could be used to characterize observers’ tendency to report visibility of a 
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threatening stimulus as a function of its quantifiable visibility, under conditions that mimic 
rivalry. This would provide an effective way to estimate the extent of response bias under 
rivalry-like conditions of partial visibility.  
Do threat-related biases generalise? 
All three paradigms that we reviewed revealed some evidence of threat-related bias 
under certain conditions. It is possible, however, that even the shared findings (e.g. a 
processing advantage of fearful over neutral faces) rely on the particular (and arguably 
unusual) stimulus conditions common to all tasks. All paradigms involve simple displays of 
no more than two isolated, static stimuli, with a high probability that a threatening stimulus 
will appear in one of a limited number of locations. More commonly, the human observer 
needs to select a subset of stimuli for further processing from a complex, dynamic scene, 
after, or in parallel with image segmentation, and often solving for partial occlusion.  Novel 
behavioral paradigms that manipulate the number, predictability and location of threatening 
stimuli in more complex displays could be implemented to place more real-world demands 
on the capacity limits and physiological constraints of the visual system. After all, 
unconscious threat processing is of little functional benefit if it only operates in very simple 
environments. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Our meta analysis and critical review together makes a number of important 
empirical, methodological and theoretical contributions. At the empirical level, we have 
quantitatively combined data from a large and diverse research field, in which there was little 
oversrching consensus. This has allowed us to identify and precisely quantify relationships 
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between threat bias and stimulus, paradigm and observer parameters, in a way not possible by 
considering the results of individual studies alone. At the stimulus level, we have shown that 
fearful faces are the only stimuli that reliably elicit a threat effect across paradigms. 
However, the threat bias elicited by fearful faces may be attributable to low-level confounds; 
fearful faces also reliably elicit equivalent bCFS effects (relative to neutral faces) in a 
spatially inverted configuration. At the paradigm level, we note that within the MVP 
paradigm, threat biases are strongly modulated by SOA. This effect of SOA was also 
strongest in studies where no awareness check was conducted. We should therefore be 
cautious in interpreting data from the MVP literature, since effects may be accounted for, to 
some extent, by partial visibility that was undetected due to insufficient awareness measures. 
We also found evidence that prioritization of threat may be quite limited at the early stages of 
perceptual selection as indexed by small initial dominance effects in the BR paradigm. At the 
observer level, our analyses suggest that anxiety may modulate threat biases, but only under 
specific presentation conditions. 
We can think of our methodological contribution in two ways. Firstly, our analysis of 
the literature has direct implication for the design of future experiments an which methods 
may form the basis for interesting new research questions. Secondly, in terms of our meta 
analysis itself, we have applied rigorous methods to tackle important issues, for example by 
using a novel combination of recent approaches to tackle dependency between effects and 
missing data. 
At the theoretical level, we have raised important questions about how awareness is 
measured and the ecological validity of different methods used to manipulate awareness. We 
have also evaluated evidence for the notion that anxious individuals have an unconscious bias 
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for threat across several different paradigms. This novel analysis invites the field to revisit 
conclusions drawn from studies that have only employed masking ot manipulate awareness 
(e.g. Bar Haim et al., 2007). Lastly, at the most basic level, our analyses may call for a re-
definition of the scope and limits of visual processing that transpire without awareness, which 
has been discussed alongside some recent theoretical frameworks (e.g. Hassin, 2013; 
Tamietto & deGelder, 2013) and narrative reviews with no quantitative component (e.g. 
Axelrod, Bar & Rees, 2015).  
Considering our meta-analyses and critical review together, we suggest that uncritical 
acceptance of the standard hypothesis, which states that threat stimuli can be identified and 
prioritized without awareness, is premature. We emphasize the significant methodological 
issues surrounding the assessment of awareness, response bias and low-level confounds. 
Tackling these substantial issues will require rigorous measures of awareness and combining 
evidence across carefully controlled, novel and ecologically valid experimental designs. 
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Footnotes 
1. As others have noted, this method is likely to be biased, since the choice of adding 
a zero effect size to the observed effects neglects the possibility of unpublished studies 
finding negative effects (Begg & Berlin, 1988) which would substantially reduce the fail-safe 
N. Moreover, this method also does not directly model the effect of i) the heterogeneity of the 
observed effects and ii) the sample sizes of the added studies, meaning the effect of adding N 
studies with an averaged null effect would be the same regardless of whether they had sample 
sizes of 10 or 10,000 (Becker, 2005). These technical issues should be considered when 
interpreting fail-safe N values that appear to be of a considerable size.  
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